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ABSTRACT
I number of issues regarding housing policy, particularly for de-
veloping countries, were explored. First housing conditions in a
number of countries were examined in depth. The controversy over
whether there is an aggregate deficit in many countries, particularly,
poorer ones, of housing units relative to the number of households was
addressed.- The standard source of data for estimating the additions
to the housing stock, official housing production figures, was com-
pared with a published data source, the census, that has nonetheless
often been overlooked when making estimates of the housing stock. It
was found that according to census data, no significant aggregate
deficits exist.
Some of the reasons for concentration on production statistics and
the neglect of census data were examined, along with some of the im-
pacts on policy of this orientation. It was argued that compared to
census data, a relatively high standard of quality for acceptable
housing is implicit in the process of collecting production data. It
was shown that if this high standard were maintained in the specifica-
tion of housing to be provided by the government, given the limited re-
sources available to governments, housing provision policies could not
hope to be comprehensive. Some of the possible failures of pursuing a
policy of provision of high quality housing on a limited scale were
discussed. Reasons for the persistence of limited but high quality
housing provision policies in spite of their weaknesses were also
treated.
The second part of the thesis consisted of a cross country econo-
metric analysis of the market for new housing. To estimate the model
as specified a new cross country data series on mortgage finance
availability was constructed from primary sources. The demand side of
the market was divided into two components, demand for units and de-
mand for floor space per unit. It was found that the demand for new
units was a function only of demographi_ variables, the increase in
- 3 -
households and the increase in population. As expected, the point
estimate of the elasticits of demand for units with respect to each
of these demographic variables was close to unity. The demand for
space per unit was found to be a function of income, price, the debt
to value ratio in housing, and a measure of cold. Point elasticities of
price and income were both less than one in absolute value. On the
supply side, the price of housing was found to be sensitive to in-
come alone, which had been included to proxy wage costs. When the total
effect of income on housing quality taking into account effects of in-
come both on the demand and supply was calculated, it was found to be
quite low, the total income (or development) elasticity being estimated
at 0.1. This confirms the impression that the housing situation im-
proves only slowly with income across countries.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. William C. Wheaton
Title: Associate Professor,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many publications discussing housing problems contain the same
illustration: a photograph showing delapidated shacks in the foreground
with modern high cost apartment buildings in the background. While
this does illustrate dramatically the disparity of housing conditions
that can be found in most cities it may also leave people with the
impression that there really is a dualistic feature to housing. When
visiting most cities one is struck by the variety in housing. There
are dwellings of all sizes, all qualities of construction and finish-
ing, made of all kinds of combinations of materials, of all shapes,
heights, colors and textures. The variety is such that a quality index
based on any of the possible criteria would vary continuously across
dwellings.
How does housing compare across countries? Each country seems to
have developed housing solutions that are ingeniously adapted to the
climate, the topography, the sociocultural circumstance and to the
level of income. The smallest, poorest houses in richer countries are
of better quality than a large portion of the housing stock in poorer
countries. In the poorest countries the very poor often live in what
can barely be called a shelter: an abandoned sewer pipe, a cardboard
box squeezed between railroad tracks, or plastic sheets nailed in a
wall along a street is all that some of the more destitute households
can afford. While the lower limit of the size and quality range of
housing in poorer countries seems to be near zero, the higher range
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is often shockingly high. The sprawling villas, the mansions and
palaces of rich and poor countries are surprisingly similar. However,
in poor countries such large dwellings are rarer, they are reserved for
a few very rich; the average size and quality of dwelling is much
lower in poor than in rich countries.
There is one exception to the diversity of housing across coun-
tries. In nearly every city of the world one can find estates of
neatly aligned blocks of four or five story walk-up apartment buildings.
Public housing seems the same everywhere! The facades are monotonously
repetitive. The layout of the flats differs only slightly. This is
surprising because the common floor plan is only suited to the life
style of a small western nuclear family. Even the construction seems
to be very similar in all countries. The same durable materials are
used; reinforced concrete for skeleton and floor slabs, masonry for
loadbearing or infilling walls (1). In richer countries public hous-
ing is near the bottom of the size and quality distribution, but be-
cause it is so similar across countries and because housing is on
average more modest in poorer countries, public housing is high in
the size-quality range in poorer countries.
This discussion of the products of the housing sector has em-
phasized variety within and between countries, a variety that suggests
flexibility and adaptability in the provisions of dwellings. One can
ask what the conditions are in the construction sector that have led
to such a result. The fact is that a great majority of the houses
sold are built by small contracting firms. When the majority of
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buyers are households or small landlords, the product market is quite
competitive. In some countries however the government may contract
for a large part of housing construction. If the bidding for these
contracts is perfectly competitive then government procurement may not
imply a departure from competitive conditions. But bidding may not be
competitive and governments may make demands, either technical or ad-
ministrative, that create barriers to entry, and create monopolies in
the construction sector. Oftentimes prices in the housing sector are
controlled; rent control is common in rich and poor countries, but it
is very widely circumvented by a variety of schemes. Rent control often
affects maintenance of the existing stock more than additions to it.
The market for the factors used in construction may not function very
smoothly. For example, wages for certain types of worker may not ad-
just in response to shortages. But the great diversity of building
materials and technologies suggests that substitutability among primary
factors and materials can greatly soften the impact of supply rigidities.
The allocation of housing consumption across households can be
fairly simply described. Expenditures on housing are rougly proportion-
al to income, except that the very poor spend a larger fraction on hous-
ing than the rich. Futhermore, housing expenditures are a good indica-
tor of other consumption. People who live in hovels usually consume un-
satisfactory levels of food, clothing, medical and educational services
as well. Inequality in the distribution of housing is not a separate
phenomenon. It is only a very visible sympton of inequality in the
distribution of income and wealth.
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A. Conventional Diagnosis of the Housing Problem
Many countries, especially the poorer ones, have declared a "hous-
ing crisis". Government pronouncements, newspaper articles, radio and
TV news, and consultants' reports all lament the housing situation.
The crisis is often proclaimed the most severe problem facing the
country. This diagnosis is based on facts that those heralding the
crisis consider overwhelmingly convincing. First of all, a large
portion of the population lives in squalid slums, in rickety shacks
along foul little alleys, without any utilities, far from schools or
clinics. Those who do not live in the slums regard them as a source
of dangerous epidemics, a breeding place for vice, crime and revolu-
tion, a national disgrace.
Calculations based on official statistics confirm the impression
that something is wrong. Experts estimate the yearly construction
requirements by adding together the number of households created an-
nually and a certain percentage (2) of the existing housing stock to
allow for replacement of worn out dwellings. When the requirements are
compared with official production statistics, a large shortfall appears.
Then this shortfall is traced back over many years. When the production
deficits of all those years are tallied, a large housing shortage is
discovered.
As our examples will show, such shortages can be staggering. The
following calculation was made in 1976 for the urban areas of Egypt.
By comparing requirements for new households and replacement with
official production figures it was discovered that, between 1960 and
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1975, the average annual shortfall had been 95,000 dwellings. The
total shortage for the entire period was estimated at 1.4 million dwell-
ings by 1975. (Joint Housing Team, 1976, p. 2.) Since almost no
families were found dwelling in the streets the conclusion of the
analysis was that households had been forced to double up (ibid., p. 1).
In 1975, there were 3.3 million families in the urban areas of Egypt,
the shortage meant that on average just about every dwelling was
occupied by two households. The shortage calculation was repeated in
a recent World Bank publication on Egypt (Ikram, 1980, p. 148).
A large shortfall in production was also found in Jakarta,
Indonesia. "A Rather low estimate by the (government of the) District
of Jakarta is that 50,000 dwellings would have to be build yearly,
while in reality only 12,000 to 15,000 houses yearly are built" (Re-
public of Indonesia, Ministry of Public Works and Power, 1973, p. 37).
Algeria has calculated that it needs to build 100,000 dwellings
per year while the total production is estimated to be below 25,000
(Ripublique Alg'rienne Democratique et Populaire, Ministere de L'Ur-
banisme, de la Construction et de L'Habitat, 1979, p. 22).
The housing shortage is even believed to be a global problem.
A comparison of housing requirements and production was made by the
United Nations for ninety developing countries (United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1976, p. 48-57). The
conclusion is that the housing deficit is increasing by 4 to 5 million
dwellings per annum in the urban areas of developing countries alone
(Ibidem, p. 6).
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While government documents tend to present the housing problem
as an arithmetic shortage, some students of the situation characterize
it otherwise. We will call these observers proponents of the ethno-
graphic view, mainly because oftentimes as we will discuss later in
Chapter III, their view is based in part on information gathered in the
course of ethnographic research, that is, direct observation of all
aspects of behaviour in a given society. These observers argue that
the number of houses is not insufficient for the number of households.
There are few families in the streets and doubling up of households in
dwellings is not a widespread phenomenon. But the houses which many
people are able to find are unsatisfactory. Thus proponents of the
ethnographic view argue that the housing problem is not too few dwell-
ings, rather too many households reduced to living in dwellings that
are substandard.
B. A Typology of Housing Problems
One purpose of this thesis will be to determine which of these
two views is correct. But it is important to put this disagreement into
a wider context of the housing problem and the appropriate policy re-
sponse. By focusing on this controversy one might get the erroneous
impression that a housing problem depends on objective facts. True, it
is important for policy makers to understand the nature of the housina
situation. However, once this matter has been clarified, it must be
determined what, if anything, is unsatisfactory about the situation,
and only then can the nature of the housing problem be defined.
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Once the housing problem has been clarified in this way, policymakers
can then decide on the nature and the extent of intervention. Note
that the above discussion implies that while the characteristics of the
housing situation can be the object of positive inquiry, whether or not
there is a housing problem is not an issue to be resolved on the basis
of positive analysis. We propose to elaborate a general typology of
the sources of dissatisfaction with the housing situation. The types
we discussed can be grouped into two classes: those that focus on the
mechanism producing the outcome, and those that focus on the outcome
itself. To clarify terminology, by an outcome in housing we mean an
allocation of dwellings to households. The mechanism is the process
which produces this allocation. The situation is the combination of
the outcome and the mechanism producing it.
1. Unsatisfactory Allocation Mechanisms
The first type of housing problem related to the allocation
mechanism is a shortage resulting from markets that fail to clear. This
occurs when prices are so inflexible that they do not rise in response
to excess demand thereby leaving some agents in the market who would
like to buy at the going price unable to do so. The supply of housing
available at going prices is not sufficient to meet the demand and to
allocate what is supplied, recourse must be made to some other mecha-
nism such as rationing. The other mechanism is viewed as inferior to
the market and herein lies the dissatisfaction with the housing situa-
tion characterized by a non-market clearing allocation.
We will not examine this source of dissatisfaction in any detail
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for a number of reasons. First, casual empiricism indicates that
housing prices are generally flexible. There is one fairly common
administrative control on prices in the housing market, rent control.
Until recently, many observers argued that rent controls did depress
housing investment and the price of rental units. However, more recent
studies (United Nations, Department of International Economic and
Social Affairs, 1979b, p. 22) of rental markets subjected to control
conclude that unless very stricK enforcement pressure is brought to
bear, rent control is successfully circumvented and the actual price
of housing rises well above the controlled level. So even in the
cases in which official prices are inflexible, actual prices paid may
rise to clear the market. Actually deciding whether housing markets
clear is no trivial matter empirically, and would take us well beyond
the scope of this thesis. Therefore, our analysis will proceed, as
have so many others, with the maintained hypothesis that housing
markets are essentially in equilibrium.
Nonetheless even when prices are flexible enough that no excess
demands or supplies persist at going prices, there may be dissatisfac-
tion with the mechanism allocating housing. The conditions in which
demand and supply are determined may be inefficient in the economic
sense for the following reasons (3). First, the production and
marketing of homes may be imperfectly competitive either for technical
reasons, such as economies to scale in production, or because of
other barriers to entry in the sector. There is not much evidence for
economies to scale sufficient to create a market wide monopoly in
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housing, though conceivably the technology of producing certain types
of housing for which there is differentiated demand may exhibit returns
to scale. The supply in that segment of the market might thus be im-
perfectly competitive. Numerous non technological barriers to entry
can be erected in the housing sector. For example, licensing procedures
and zoning and building specifications may be used to protect existing
entrepreneurs from further entry. On the demand side of the market,
there may be imperfect dissemination of information. For example as
regards the housing market, people may not know of all the alternatives
available to them particularly because one dimension of these alterna-
tives is spatial and cannot be costlessly explored. People may also
not be aware of all the benefits of housing, particularly indirect
benefits to their physical and mental health derived from increased
consumption of housing. Finally, there may be externalities in the con-
sumption of housing, so decisions based on individual maximisation may
not be socially optimal. For example, the Victorian reformers pro-
pounded the view that poor housing bred crime and other anti social
behaviour as well as disease and misery. A more straight forward
example of an externality is the fire hazard that one ramshackle house
presents to an entire neighborhood.
Finally, we note that many of the above mentioned imperfections
in the product market for housing may also exist in the markets for
factors used in housing. Housing production relies on a great deal of
skilled and unskilled labor and these markets are considered commonly
subject to such imperfections.
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Up to now, we have been discussing the housing market more or
less as an aggregate. If it is possible to distinguish separate
supplies and demands for different types of housing, one might want
to consider submarkets of the housing market separately. If consumers
distinguish among the levels of utility they derive from consuming
different types of housing, then a separate demand for these types of
housing can also be distinguished. Some of these demands may be gen-
erated imperfectly. For example, there may be externalities to the
consumption of some types of housing while not to others. Likewise
supply of most types of housing may be perfectly competitive, but there
may be administrative or technological barriers to entry into the pro-
duction of certain types of housing, such as high rise apartment
blocks. When this is the case, supply in that submarket may not be
competitive and the market allocation mechanism would thus not be
efficient. We also note that in these submarkets of the housing market,
prices may be inflexible so the allocation would occur in a non-clearing
market, Though we mention the possibility of malfunctioning or non-
clearing of submarkets, we will not treat submarkets at length, That
would require a detailed study in its own right. This thesis focuses
on aggregate housing investment in the long run. In the short run,
imperfections in supply of certain types of housing may well play an
important role but they -e outside of the scope of this work.
Now that we have ciscussed a number of the instances of imperfec-
tions in the mechanism of provision and allocation of housing, we will
elaborate further why they are considered a problem. The above im-
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perfections if present in the market will cause inefficiencies in
resource allocation. If the market mechanism could be improved then
aggregate income could be increased using the same amount of resources.
2. Unsatisfactory Housing Outcomes
The reasons for dissatisfaction with a housing situation as dis-
cussed above are all based on dissatisfaction with the allocation
mechanism. But another class of criteria for declaring that a housing
problem exists is based on evaluating the characteristics of the actual
housing outcome, regardless of how it is reached. An illustrative
example of this type of problem can be taken from another market, that
for food. Even if the market works perfectly, but either some incomes
are so low or prices so high that large numbers of the population starve
to death in a given year, then it is implausible that any one would deny
there is a food problem. We argue that a similar type of reasoning
motivates much of the dissatisfaction with the housing situation,
though it is often not recognized as such. For example, the housing
market is criticized for supply inefficiencies that keep prices so
high that poor people cannot afford good housing. Though these in-
efficiencies may sometimes exist, in some cases the criticism of the
housing market is phrased in terms of them regardless of whether it
has been determined that they exist or not. The nature of the outcome
may well be the only aspect of the situation truly unsatisfactory to
the critics, but confusing morality with efficiency, they may auto-
matically assume that since the outcome is unsatisfactory, the mechan-
ism must be,
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Housing outcomes can be evaluated according to a number of differ-
ent types of considerations. The first type of consideration is a
moral one. On grounds totally divorced from efficiency, the market
outcome in the housing sector may have features that are offensive and
thus should be changed. There are numerous moral grounds on which
outcomes can be judged unsatisfactory. For some, there may be an
absolute level of deprivation in terms of housing which should not be
exceeded. For others, the housing outcome may be offensive because
the distribution of housing services exceeds some acceptable degree of
inequality. If one believes that people have equal rights to the joys
and comforts of life, then an outcome in which one of these, housing,
is distributed very unequally is wrong.
There are two other types of consideration that might be applied
to a housing situation, regardless of the mechanism which produces
it. These are both purported to be concerns with efficiency. As
distinct from moral considerations, these have as their objective the
improvement of resource allocation and thus of total output. The first
set of these efficiency considerations is that concerned with social
efficiency. Proponents of this view argue that if the housing out-
come could be changed to provide a higher minimum level of housing
consumption, social welfare could be increased. The reason is that
poor housing conditions effect not only the individuals living in them
but-other members of society as well. Some authors argue that poor
housing promotes anti-social behaviour, and that an undesirable level
of political unrest stems from the dissatisfaction that poor housing
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breeds (4). According to this argument, the government and richer
members of society would benefit if the housing conditions of the
poor were improved over those they choose in equilibrium.
The second efficiency consideration regards benefits the workers
themselves receive from housing. It is argued that if workers had a
certain standard of housing above the level they choose in equilibrium,
then their productivity and hence their incomes would rise and their
welfare would improve over and above the improvement in housing con-
ditions. (5)
Both these lines of reasoning are similar to those we discussed
in the section on imperfections in the allocation mechanism. The only
difference in this case is that those espousing these two views argue
that there is an optimal minimum standard that is independent of
other conditions in the economy since it will not automatically result
from the workings of an efficient allocation mechanism. Unfortunately,
there is a logical flaw in the above stated argument because an ef-
ficient allocation mechanism taking into account effects of housing
on productivity of workers and on other members of society will
generate the optimal minimum level of housing. This follows from the
most fundamental tenets of welfare economics. An efficiently generated
outcome will make the best use of available resources and in so doing
will weigh the benefits of increasing minimum levels of housing con-
sumption against the opportunity costs of doing so. No large realloca-
tion of resources towards housing for the poor can be made without
worsening conditions elsewhere, if the outcome has been reached by a
- 25 -
fully efficient allocation mechanism. For example, a proponent of the
absolute minimum standard view might argue that the poor should consume
much more housing than they do in an efficiently generated outcome. In
support of this view he would contend that worker productivity would rise
considerably as their housing conditions improve. That assertion could
well be correct and still the reallocation could not be justified on ef-
ficiency grounds. This is because the resources used to improve housing
must be taken away from some other use, for example, food or health expen-
diture, which also improves worker productivity. If the reallocation a-
way from the efficiently generated equilibrium is large, then the loss in
productivity due to the reduced expenditure on food or health care out-
weighs the improvement in worker productivity derived from the ameliora-
tion of housing conditions. We know that this must be true from the pro-
perties of an equilibrium reached by an efficient mechanism. Thus accord-
ing to our typology, dissatisfaction with a housing outcome, if generated
by an efficient allocation mechanism can be logically based only on moral
considerations. And we reiterate that moral considerations could dictate
a mimimum level of housing that would be greater than the "efficient" level.
That, in turn, may imply greater worker productivity or fewer social ills
than the efficient solution.
We have enumerated several types of moral consideration that
might be used to judge a housing outcome. But to decide whether the
outcome represents a problem or not, requirements must be determined,
and the many dimensions of a housing outcome must meet these in order
to be morally satisfactory. Depending on the set of moral values,
there may be no requirements on certain dimensions of the situation.
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Perhaps just a few key variables will be of interest. For example,
one might decide that certain features, such as floor space per person
or plumbing facilities, must meet a certain standard in all houses.
Or one may be concerned with general housing conditions for certain
groups: income classes, age groups, certain family configurations, such
as young families or single parents, the handicapped, dissatisfied and
underpaid civil servants, or politically aware university graduates.
Oftentimes, concern over the outcome for a certain subgroup of
the population is phrased in terms of the inadequacy of the function-
ing of the submarket serving this group. But such characterizations
of the problem can be misleading. What is called a failure of the sub-
market is often only a failure to provide what the observer considers
to be decent housing for that subgroup, at a just price. That some
social group should be housed according to a given standard is defens-
ible as a moral consideration. But to call any housing situation in
which this is not the case a problem of inadequate markets is simply
unjustified before the actual functioning of the market has been
investigated.
All moral considerations and the standards that flow from them
are not given once and for all. Some are a social phenomenon, not
natural laws, and may thus change with social conditions. Even if the
moral considerations stay the same, what they require of an acceptable
outcome may change as the conception of what is morally acceptable
does. Requirements may even be defined dynamically. For example, a
moral standard may dictate that no one's housing situation even be
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worsened, if someone else's has been improved. Standards may also be
based on historically defined relationships. It may be thought that
one social class simply has to have housing of noticeably higher
quality than the housing of some social class they see as below them.
Over time, acceptable relationships may also change. For example, the
received anthropological wisdom on the peasantry is that traditional
peasant societies tolerate relatively little disparity in all consump-
tion including that of housing. In an evolved industrial society,
perhaps in response to different economic conditions, moral considera-
tions may only require a minimum standard but will see no evil whatever
in permitting some households to live in opulent settings worth hundreds
of times the value of the minimum dwelling. Or more simply, moral re-
quirements may change with reduced or increased resource availability.
Surely the twentieth century conception of squalor is not the same as
that held in the Rennaissance.
Relative price changes may also change what constitutes squalor.
Now that energy prices are so high, a poorly insulated house is con-
sidered much more of a hardship than it once was. As the relative price
of consumer durables has fallen, minimum requirements for electrical
installations and space have increased. Less mundane social changes
may also play an important role in defining minimum standards. For
example, as missionaries have more influence among the Cayapa Indians
of Northern Ecuador, the.latter are increasingly convinced that a
separate bedroom for married couples is necessary whereas before, a
simple elevated platform, covered with a thatch roof and without
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partitions or walls was considered to provide adequate privacy.
We cannot begin to list all the types of standards that may be
generated from the different types of moral considerations, nor can we
hope to model deterministically how both moral considerations and
standards change over time. The objective of this research is not the
study of the formation of standards in housing. Our concern is, among
others, to analyze the consequences of the standards which actually
exist and the means by which they have been implemented.
C. Housing Problems and Policy Alternatives
Now that we have discussed in some detail the types of housing
problems and classified them according to the source of the dissatis-
faction with the housing situation, we will turn to a discussion of the
policy alternatives available to deal with different types of problems.
When markets do not clear the problem can be solved by making the price
flexible. If the inflexibility results from administrative controls
these can be dismantled. For example, in the case of rent control,
one can make prices flexible at the margin with a measure such as
vacancy decontrol or flexible in the large with total decontrol. If
price inflexibility has other than administrative causes, it may not
be possible to eliminate it.
The second type of housing problem was defined precisely as the
outcome of an imperfect market mechanism. Thus improvement of the
mechanism of demand and supply is called for. In case of imperfect
competition in supply such as monopoly or oligopoly, then anitrust
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laws can be passed and enforced to improve the market. Imperfect dis-
semination of information may be improved by government policies de-
signed to reduce the cost of gathering information. The government
may publish data or set up information exchanges. When consumers are
ill informed as to the benefits they derive from housing, an information
campaign can be mounted, Educators believe that the primary school
curriculum is an effective means of disseminating information on the
relation of housing to health and of inculcating the desire to make
one's environment a healthy one. Finally, for externalities, the
remedial policy is not so clearcut because what is necessary is the
creation of a means of internalizing the costs and benefits that are
not borne and captured privately. For example, a system of fines, as
has been proposed for pollution problems, can also be used to internal-
ize housing externalities. Certain types of subsidies for consumption
of housing might also be used.
The third type of housing problem, where dissatisfaction is with
the outcome, no matter how it has been reached, leaves more latitude
in the choice of an appropriate policy. The previous two problems
relate to the housing allocation mechanism, hence the mechanism must
be improved to solve the problem. A perfectly efficient outcome which
is unacceptable on moral grounds requires policies that either directly
change those aspects of the outcome which are unsatisfactory or that
focus on changing other variables that will indirectly affect these
target variables in the outcome.
Changing directly the outcome of the housing market requires
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some redistribution of the consumption of housing. This can be done
in the large redistributing the housing stock. Redistribution of the
housing stock was proposed by Engels as early as 1872 (Engels, 1975,
p. 51). It was advocated by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky in 1917
(Bukharin, 1970, p. 401). Lenin drafted the law "On Requisitioning the
Houses of the Rich for Alleviating the Needs of the Poor" and issued
the "Fundamental of the Law on the Confiscation of Apartment Houses"
(Sosnovy, 1954, p. 12). The Law of August 1918 declared the national-
ization of most privately operated housing and thereby facilitated re-
distribution. During the period of War Communism, from 1918 to 1920,
families were transferred from bunk apartments and basement quarters
to nationalized houses. In Moscow and Leningrad alone one million
people benefited from the redistribution of housing space (ibidem,
p. 14-15). However in the Soviet Union, this one time improvement for
many was followed by a slow decline of housing conditions for all, be-
cause the existing housing stock was not maintained and new housing
construction was a very low investment priority. Destruction during
World War II also contributed to the problem (6), and the housing
situation worsened until about 1957 (Di Maio, 1974, p. 15-17), when
the allocation of resources to housing investment started to increase.
A redistribution of housing also occurred in China after the
Revolution (Peking Review, 1975, No. 48, p. 18). Before 1949, in the
rural areas "the landowners possessed spacious accommodation, but the
poor and landless peasants lacked housing space. By redistributing
housing according to individual needs, generally all peasants received
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quite generous housing space" (Kwok, 1978, p. 256). In the urban areas
the redistribution may have been somewhat slower. (7) "Following the
socialist transformation of private industry and commerce in 1956,
privately owned houses, except for those left for the use of the owners
themselves and the small number of rooms to be let out by the owners
according to government policy, were transformed into public ownership"
(Peking Review, 1975, No. 48, p. 17). However even after 1956 a sub-
stantial portion of the urban housing remained in private hands (Howe,
1968, p. 87). For a while after 1956 the distribution of housing re-
mained unequal because private landlords refused to sublet. (8) The
equalization occurred gradually as home owners and well-to-do people
lost their previous income sources and consequently had to rent out or
give away part of the houses they had occupied before (Chao, 1968, p.
106). (9) In addition "some home owners discovered that house main-
tenance costs were higher than the public housing rents and decided
to either sell or voluntarily forfeit their ownership rights to the
government in order to be eligible for a new public housing unit"
(Kowk, 1973, p. 233). It seems thus that in China the redistribution
of urban housing happened only gradually, partly directly, and partly
as a consequence of the redistribution of income and wealth.
In the Soviet Union and China, the housing stock was redistributed
on a large scale, but the government also used a large scale indirect
method of changing the outcome, major income income distribution. If
demand for housing is a positive function of incometo increase the
housing consumption of the poor, one can give them more income.
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Furthermore if moral objections to market outcomes go further than the
housing market, and it is thus felt that not only housing but food,
health care, and education are consumed at unsatisfactorily low levels
among the poor and if household demand for these items is a positive
function of income, then income redistribution towards the poor families
will improve outcomes in these areas as well. However, to raise the
incomes of all families to a level where they choose to consume the
minimum moral standard of all these goods, or even of housing alone,
may involve redistribution of income so substantial that it may be
impossible to implement without considerable reorganization of society.
Most governments shy away from making such radical changes. In-
stead of making large changes in variables such as income, that in-
directly affect the outcome, they often prefer to directly alter the
outcome at the margin, and choose to change the housing situation by
influencing investment in housing. Most governments are likely to
choose this approach to avoid the major political upheaval required
for alternative strategies, perhaps because they believe that such
upheaval would provoke so much loss of life and property that in the
end everybody would be worse off or they may simply be opposed to
radical approaches on ideological grounds. Critics of the gradualist
approach argue that it is devious because, while preserving the ad-
vantages of the rich and powerful, it also lessens the resentment of
the poor. However the purpose of this thesis is neither to describe
that debate nor attempt to resolve it. We will simply take as given
that most governments choose to improve the housing situation by mak-
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ing marginal changes.
The conventional instruments which governments use to influence
housing investment can be classified into two types, direct supply
policies and price policies. The purpose of the direct supply policies
is to devote a portion of housing investment to provide proper housing
directly to those who do not or cannot obtain it for themselves in the
open market. Governments have the choice of either selling or renting
public housing, but in either case the sale price or the rent is
usually subsidized to make the level of housing offered affordable
for the poor.
The certitude of improving the welfare of those in need by provid-
ing them with proper housing is not the only reason governments choose
a direct supply policy. They see such a policy as a tool for achieving
additional goals. Public housing programs offer the opportunity of
shaping the urban environment precisely and directly. Location,
density, and the overall aspect and organization of cities can be
more easily directed using housing projects than using indirect means
such as regulations and zoning.
Price policies provide an alternative means of influencing
housing investment. The purpose of such policies is to reduce the
price of housing so that some who otherwise would not, can now afford
an appropriate dwelling.
One way the government may try to lower the supply price of
housing is through subsidies. These can be introduced at any point
in the housing production process. Building materials, construction
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equipment, and construction loans can all be subsidized. Developers
of dwellings sold to low income families can receive lump sum subsi-
dies. If they rent to the poor they may be given a rent subsidy as
we11.
All the price reducing measures mentioned above affect the supply
side of the market only, but a few measures are geared towards the de-
mand side as well. The government may help poor families to buy their
dwelling by granting them mortgage loans at concessionary rates. Hous-
ing debt can also be subsidized through the taxation system, either
through the income tax deduction of part or all of loan repayments or
through depreciation allowances. Governments can try to convince the
population that better housing increases their welfare more than they
realize. Or governments can discourage non-housing consumption by
either increasing prices of other goods relative to housing or creating
shortages of other goods. Governments can encourage and organize
saving for investment in housing; they may even go so far as to promise
to match accumulated savings if applied to the purchase of a dwelling.
Direct subsidies, in the form of rent or house purchase vouchers, are
often used to lower the prices that households face.
Almost all the subsidies just presented can either be restricted
to a particular group of households, or to a particular type or loca-
tion of dwelling, or they can be applied across the board to all house-
holds and all dwellings. Limiting the subsidies to target households
has a great advantage. It only benefits those that need help most
and thus provides the most benefits for the least total disbursement.
- 35 -
The main disadvantage is that it may be difficult and costly to admin-
ister a subsidy program so that only needy households benefit. Also,
finding an eligibility requirement for an exclusive subsidy that is
not simply an arbitrary dividing line is extremely difficult, if not
impossible. A household with resources just above the eligibility
level will not benefit from the program though its needs are almost
the same as those of some household receiving the subsidy.
A subsidy program that is restricted to a certain type or loca-
tion of dwelling may be slightly easier to administer. But because
beneficiaries need not satisfy any requirements, it is difficult to
predict the incidence of such a subsidy. One can attempt to subsidize
dwellings that will not be attractive to households that are not in
need, but dwellings of this type are often unattractive and unsuitable
for anyone. Such a subsidy policy would then subvert the original
purpose of having a subsidy: providing decent housing for the needy.
As this review of policy options to affect housing outcomes shows,
there is a wide variety of options available to changing an unsatis-
factory outcome. Yet, there is a surprising similarity in government
policies across countries. Aside from measures to improve market
mechanisms, which some governments do take, in poorer countries it is
most common for governments to choose to intervene in the housing
market with direct supply policies, more specifically, by constructing
public housing. On the other hand, in richer countries both price and
direct supply policies are used to influence housing investment. We
argue that the poor countries rely heavily on direct supply policies
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because their governments simply do not have the apparatus to implement
price policies effectively. For example, governments in developing
countries usually do not have access to accurate enough information
abut incomes and wealth to verify the claims for eligibility of pro-
spective subsidy recipients. Furthermore they do not have the revenues
to dispense untargeted subsidies. In contrast, direct supply policies
are attractive because the governments' relatively small capacity for
enforcement is less of a handicap for their implementation. Below we
develop in detail the reasons why this is the case.
One advantage of direct supply policies is that the budgetary
requirements are easier to predict and limit than those of subsidies
or other pricing policies. The cost of a public housing project will
only be the subsidy implied in the project: total costs minus the re-
payments by the beneficiary households. Of course budget overruns
can occur, very often there are unpredicted cost increases which cannot
be passed on, and which therefore increase the necessary outlay. But
the obligation is limited to the specific project, the one time and
recurrent outlays are thus easier to predict.
Market improving price policies have a disadvantage in that the
benefits are quite difficult to measure. For example, it is next to
impossible to know how much a given level of expenditure on disseminat-
ing information will actually lower equilibrium prices. Moreover even
if the effected change in equilibrium prices were known, the government
still would not know how close it had come to bringing the total popu-
lation to a minimum standard of housing. Similar reasoning applies to
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subsidies. Though the effects on price might be easier to estimate if
supply and demand parameters were known, and they are not generally
known, the problem remains that the goods one subsidizes may have al-
ternative uses. In the case that they do, the effects are widely
spread throughout the economy. Hence both the returns on outlay and
the optimal levels of outlay for price policies are difficult to cal-
culate.
For the above stated reasons, the governments of poorer countries,
limited by meager resources, their low level of penetration in society,
and their need to produce tangible results, may prefer direct supply
policies. There is, however, a major problem with such policies,
especially in poorer countries; in the absence of strict enforcement,
households which are given public housing will trade it away. With
direct supply policy households are offered dwellings which are much
larger, better built and more expensive than they would normally afford
at their income level. In order to convince the households to accept
the decent dwelling governments have to subsidize the cost down to
what the households would normally spend on housing. The subsidies
involved are always substantial and in many cases the subsidy is a
multiple of the household's income. As a consequence there is a great
temptation to transform the subsidy into income. Households are very
ingenious at inventing schemes to make these trades in spite of the
governments' efforts to prevent them. Some households sell the right
of occupancy outright and move out, some sublet rooms, and subdivide
the dwelling into smaller dwellings. Others disassemble part of the
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construction and sell it as building materials to other households,
still others turn part or all of their dwellings into retail or work
shops to rent to others or for their own use.
After the households have been able to trade the subsidy into in-
come they may increase their overall consumption but it will be dis-
tributed according to their own preferences rather than to those of
the government. Thus while public housing programs may not improve
the housing conditions of the poor as much as intended, at least they
constitute indirect income transfers to the poor. The increase in
income coming from the transfer will probably induce beneficiary house-
holds to consume more housing. But the increase in housing consumption
will be much smaller than the increase the government intended when it
embarked upon a public housing program. One reason why this policy
is often less effective than might have been originally expected is
that while apparently trying to alter an aspect of the outcome which
was undesirable, those designing the policy neglected the fact that
changing the outcome does not change the mechanism of allocation.
Since housing is allocated by means of a market, the benefit of sub-
sidizing housing can be transformed into generalized purchasing power.
Furthermore, given that all markets allocate according to ability to
pay, individuals may want to realize this general purchasing power for
necessities other than housing. If they were rich they might want the
house offered them, but since they are not, they have many other press-
ing needs besides housing to which any available income can be devoted.
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D. Summary of the Main Questions This Thesis Will Attempt to
Answer
Thus far in this introduction we have concentrated on elaborating
a general typology of housing problems classifying them according to
the source of dissatisfaction with the housing situation. This typology
was developed to situate some characterizations of the housing problem
made by policy makers and academic observers in a wider context. We
then developed a categorization of policy as a response to various
types of housing problems. Within the general framework we have ad-
vanced, let us now discuss the questions we will attempt to answer in
this thesis.
1. The first question is to resolve the issue as to the nature
of the actual conditions in housing. Government publications proclaim
that there is an aggregate shortage of dwellings. Yet the ethnographic
view disagrees. We will not examine the nature of the housing situation
on a disaggregated level. For example, we will not explore regional
shortages. We limit ourselves to examining the aggregate housing
situation, and only the adequacy of the stock in terms of numbers,
not in terms of quality or other terms. We choose to limit our-
selves in this way primarily because this is one of the major
issues over which there has been some disagreement. And, it is
in terms of the adequacy of the total number of dwellings that the
housing policy issue in developing countries has been posed. We intend
to asertain which of the two views, administrative or ethnographic
is correct. In investigating this issue we intend also to elucidate
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and emphasize the role standards play not only in defining a housing
shortage, but also in both grasping the actual nature of the housing
situation and in choosing a respone to the perceived problem. We
emphasize that though most of the discussion in this chapter focused
on the analysis that must follow the correct prehension of actual
housing conditions, current debates indicate that even that task is
far from completed. So resolving the administrative versus ethnographic
view debate is of considerable policy importance.
2. Our typology of housing problems cited imperfections in the
generation of demand or supply as a possible source of dissatisfaction
with the housing situation. Many assessments of the evolution of the
housing sector, particularly in periods of rapid growth, have lamented
a supposed faulty supply response in housing. We would like to test
whether supply rigidities that would result from imperfect functioning
of housing markets actually exist, or whether the observed rise in the
price of housing in the course of development is simply a result of
the functioning of reasonably well ordered markets.
3. We have discussed the possibility that dissatisfaction with
housing outcomes may be the root of a housing problem. Then we listed
a few policies that could be used to affect outcomes. In this thesis
we examine the quantitative effects of a number of policies that can
be used to change housing outcomes. We hope to ascertain which are
the most effective, and which,if any, have no effect at all.
4. Finally, to complete the policy analysis, we will obtain
quantitative assessments of the effect of no intervention at all. Thus
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we will calculate the effect of income growth alone on housing
investment.
These questions might be analyzed at different levels of aggrega-
tion and using different methods and different data sources. One might
make case studies, examining only one or a few countries in depth, or
one might use statistical analysis that focuses on the interpretation
of quantifiable data. We have chosen the latter method, since detailed
case studies were not feasible. We have also chosen to look at aggre-
gate housing investment rather than any particular submarkets. This
choice was made primarily because the data necessary for statistical
analysis is not available for disaggregated housing markets for most
countries. A study of the detailed operation of housing markets would
also require another methodology and different data sources and thus
will not be undertaken here.
We also decided to analyze long run rather than short run re-
sponses. Generally the long run is understood to be the period over
which all factors of production are mobile, usually several years.
Time series for long run statistical analyses for a few countries are
not available since even if series exist over a long period, one can-
not be certain that the observed variations are reliable. Therefore
we used cross country data, which is widely accepted as the next best
source for long run analysis.
The thesis will be organized as follows. In Chapter II we will
survey the literature to examine how previous authors have dealt with
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these questions. In Chapter III we will answer the first of the ques-
tions just mentioned, that is, we will try to reconcile the opposing
views of the housing problem. Then we will explore the consequences
of a combination of a direct supply policy and high standards for
dwellings, and the possible reasons for the continuation of such
policies. In Chapters IV and V we will develop a theory of both the
demand and the supply side of housing investment. In Chapter VI we
will estimate the system of equations describing demand and supply.
Then we will test hypotheses on how the various policy and other
variables affect housing investment. Chapter VII states our conclu-
sions and suggestions for further inquiry.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I
(1) There are other forms of public housing besides the five story
walk up such as the detached bungelow type or the twenty story tower
that one finds in many countries, rich or poor. For those types also
size and quality are quite similar across countries. A more recent
form of public housing are the core houses and sites and services
schemes. Although in these schemes the initial intervention by govern-
ments are often very similar across countries, the housing produced
in the end is usually well adapted to local circumstances because the
completion of the dwellings is left to the initiative of the households.
(2) The percentage of the existing stock that is needed for replace-
ment depends on a variety of variables describing the characteristics
of the existing dwellings, on maintenance costs and on a variety of
other economic variables. Where sufficient data are available one could
estimate the percentage using regression analysis. But in most estimates
of housing need have used rules of thumb. Most experts agree that each
year between 1.5 and 2.0 percent of the housing stock needs to be re-
placed.
(3) Here we are using supply in a broad sense to refer to the seller's
side of the market. Strictly speaking, a supply function independent
of demand conditions only exists when suppliers are perfectly competi-
tive and take prices as given. However, even when suppliers are not
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price takers there is supply. In the case of a momopolist for example,
there is a profit maximizing price and quantity, a supply point at which
the momopolist chooses to produce. In other cases of imperfect compe-
tition, the supply may be more complex to determine, but in any market
configuration, a decision is made to bring goods to the market, and the
conditions governing this decision determine what we call supply.
(4) Murison and Lea (1979, p. 33-34) is a recent presentation of these
views. Earlier Abrams (1964, p. 143) stated a similar argument.
(5) Burns and Grebler (1977, p. 104).
(6) The destructions during the Second World War were enormous. "The
Nazi invaders razed to the ground more than 70,000 towns, urban-type
settlements and villages; they destroyed nearly 100 million square
meters of dwelling space.. .some 25 million Soviet citizens -were
left homeless" (Zhukov and Fyodorov, 1974, p. 16).
(7) "Implicitly, the ideology maintained an ultimate goal of public
ownership of all housing. However the government legally protected
private ownership of housing for the owner's use and for limited
renting... (In some cities) confusion at the local level extended con-
fiscation to privately owned sotck" (Kwok, 1973, p. 229).
(8) Landlords feared that they would be forced to rent at excessively
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low rents and were in any case reluctant to suffer the political con-
sequences of becoming a member of the exploiting class (Ibidem, p. 88).
(9) The fear of being accused of being parasitic elements of an ex-




The object of this thesis is to conduct an empirical investiga-
tion of housing investment across countries for the purpose of analyz-
ing issues of policy significance. Thus it is appropriate to discuss
both the empirical literature exploring the behaviour of investment and
the normative literature discussing the policy stance that government
should adopt in directing the process of housing investment.
Let us begin our discussion of the literature with the early
normative treatments. The Soviet Union was one of the first countries
in which the question of the appropriate level of housing investment
was seriously debated. In the twenties, with the advent of development
planning, almost all aspects of the economy came under the scrutiny of
both the corps of technicians and economists at Gosplan, the State
Planning Commission, and the ideologues of the Communist Party. Since
capital was believed to be extremely scarce, much discussion focused
on determining the optimal composition of investment. Moderates,
among them Bukharin and Stalin, urged that since labor was plentiful,
capital should be accumulated in labor-using industries. Radicals,
like Trotsky and Preobrazhensky, argued that reducing dependence on
imports was critical, thus investment should be devoted to developing
capacity in heavy industry. By the late twenties, the issue had been
resolved in favor of the autarkic approach. (1) Choosing to concentrate
investment efforts on heavy industry had ramifications for the role of
housing in development. This is because developing heavy industry
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dictated concentration of production capacity in large urban complexes.
However, given the conditions in the Soviet Union at the time, assemb-
ling a work force for these industrial nodes would require considerable
migration from rural areas. That migration would entail certain costs,
and measures had to be taken to minimize them. One of the primary
means of doing so was to deliberately restrain the level of housing
investment and thus accommodate the surge in demand for urban housing
with the least resources possible. Moreover, excess migration from
rural areas would have increased the costs of urbanization. Keeping
urban housing conditions relatively bleak prevented the cities from be-
coming inordinately attractive to rural dwellers. (Nove 76, p. 246)
In the thirties, while the Soviets were industrializing, the
critical problem for the Western powers had been mobilizing idle capac-
ity. During that time promoting housing investment had been considered
as a means of increasing effective demand, but was used only to a
limited extent. Mobilization for the War effort changed the focus
of policymakers, and attention was turned to economizing scarce re-
sources. In the housing sector, the government was given the power
to construct houses in those critical areas where workers were needed
for the defense effort, but the standards forthis housing were kept
low to economize on scarce materials. The low standards were not
openly challenged. Rather the policy debate was over the roles of the
private and public sector in providing housing.
During the Korean War, while the public versus private debate
continued, the issue of the quality of housing units was also raised.
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That a sufficient number of housing units had to be provided for de-
fense workers was not in doubt. The view was put forth most simply
and colorfully by Harvey Knox, Mayor of San Diego in a letter to the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency: "This city builds airplanes,
airplanes require manpower, manpower requires housing, no house, no
manpower, no airplanes - Joe Stalin in command." (U.S. Congress,
Senate 1951a, p. 226) But William Levitt, a well known housing de-
veloper argued that quality was reduced to an unwarranted low level
during the Second World War. He argued that he had been forced to
build houses using "everything except sheer molasses" and as a con-
sequence they were "wholesale junk" (ibidem, p. 178). He argues that
the maintenance costs of those houses still in use were enormous, and
that if such a policy were adopted again. the payoff in the savings
of strategic materials would be outweighed by future maintenance
costs. The government resolved the debate by choosing to economize
strategic materials as much as possible, and producing a large number
of low quality units.
Implicit in the question that Levitt raised was the concept of
time preference and the optimal path of housing investment. Howenstine
approached the problem with explicit focus on timing housing invest-
ment appropriately in the context of an overall optimal development
plan. According to Howenstine, in a first stage housing investment
should be kept at a minimum because it uses resources needed for
more productive investment opportunities. Later, when underemployment
and unemployment have been eliminated, housing investment can be
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expanded to boost worker productivity. In a final stage housing in-
vestment should simply be permitted to respond to the preferences of
households. (Howenstine, 1957, p. 23)
Earlier W. Arthur Lewis argued against low levels of housing
investment, contending that the Soviet planners had forced too great
a hardship on their people, and Western planners would gravely err
by using a similar approach in poor countries (Lewis, 1949, p. 54).
Like the Soviet planners Lewis saw housing investment as a necessary
concomitant of industrialization, but he felt that the quality should
not be reduced to keep housing outlays low.
The normative literature we have been discussing situates housing
in an overall planning concept. However there is another normative
strand of literature that concerns itself with housing standards re-
gardless of the economic growth and housing's effect on it. The
literature is vast and disparate. We will group it into three types.
The first of these is descriptive literature, which informed the public
of the nature of housing conditions among the very poor. Writers such
as Dickens, Hugo, Zola and others started a tradition of chronicling
the material aspects of the life of the lower classes. Official re-
ports such as the Public Health Reports in Britain in the 1860's pro-
vided detailed information on the accommodations of the poor. Follow-
ing hard on the publication of accounts of bleak housing conditions
was the second strand of literature, decrying these conditions. The
classic work in this vein is The Bitter Cry of Outcast London publish-
ed by Reverend Mearns in 1883. Engels' The Conditions of the Working
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Class in 1844 was also a seminal piece in a similar vein. The American
exemplar of this decrying literature is Jacob Riis' How the Other Half
Lives (1890). Kaethe Kollwitz woodcuts expressed in images the same
outraged sentiment. The third type of nomative literature on housing
made proposals for minimum standards, for providing modest but decent
housing. The Utopians always included designs for appropriate worker
housing. Court decisions set down standards to which laws and
regulations added further minimum specifications. Well known architects
submitted designs of model housing for workers to international ex-
positions and competitions.
This review of normative views of housing investment has revealed
a number of different strands of thought. First, there is the theme
of the dynamic role of housing in accommodating the movements of popu-
lation necessary for development, or for wartime mobilization. Then
there is the issue as to the amount of resources that should be devoted
to this accommodation. That question encompasses the tradeoff between
higher investment in sectors other than housing and lower costs of main-
tenance and replacement of the housing stock in the future. There is
the justification for housing as a merit good, as a means of raisinq
the productivity of the workforce, and finally the moral case for im-
proving the housing conditions of the very poor.
Currently all. these strands in the normative literature have a
certain acceptance among policy makers. Yet what seems to happen now
is that different policy making bodies each adopt one or a few of these
views. For example, housing departments are likely to see housing
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as a merit good, while the ministry of planning may view it with
Howenstine's perspective, that is, as a low priority item in a capital
scarce economy. In the Soviet Union in the twenties and in the United
States during the Korean War and World War II, planning was centralized
and consistent and efficient allocation of resources was the primary
emphasis. In that context, housing investment was not viewed as uni-
dimensional phenomenon as it has tended to be in recent policy dis-
cussion. Quantity and quality were both at issue and the trade-offs
implicit. Different combinations of these were explicitly weighed in
the elaboration of policy. As we shall see in Chapter III, neglecting
the limited amount of resources available for housing has led to the
formulation of policies that may be quite simply inconsistent with
the level of resources available in poor countries. We shall try to
show, in our analysis of the effects of housing policies, that perhaps
a return to considering alternative quantity and quality combinations
may help generate housing policies that will more effectively attack
the crucial problems.
Having discussed some of the important points in the normative
literature on housing investment, we now turn to reviewing existing
studies that address the positive questions which we intend to explore
in this thesis. There are really two sorts of issues to which these
questions are addressed. One set of questions is concerned with the
mechanics of government policy, the government's perception of problems,
their choice of solutions, the effect of their particular choice and the
reasons for its persistence. The second set of questions fits into the
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framework of an appropriate theory of the determinants of housing in-
vestment.
In the literature there is very little discussion of the reason
for the conflicting perceptions of the housing problem. However three
authors have mentioned the possibility that official statistics under-
measure housing production. Strassmann considers the problem to be re-
stricted to developing countries (Strassmann, 1970, p. 393). Eckaus
suggests that the undermeasurement is worse in the rural areas of de-
veloping countries where most housing demand is satisfied outside the
marketplace (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
1973, p. 35). Burns and Grebler concur with Strassmann but believe the
undermeasurement also occurs in developed countries where the value of
new housing is often underreported (Burns and Grebler, 1977, p. 44).
Angel et al. are the only authors who point out that undermeasurement
of housing production may lead the government to overestimate the mag-
nitude of the housing problem. They blame the housing shortage on the
"arithmetic approach" of governments who calculate the shortage by
subtracting the number of "good" dwellings in the housing stock from
the number of households. According to the authors the amount of "good"
dwellings in the housing stock from the number of households. Accord-
ing to the authors the amount of "good" bousing is restricted by the
government's insistence on unrealistically high standards (Angel, 1977,
p. 79).
Although it is a common topic of discussion between policy makers
and their consultants, the effects on the actual realization of govern-
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ment goals of simultaneously opting for public housing production and
adopting unrealistically high standards for this housing have not, as
far as we know, been formally analyzed in the literature. Likewise, no
author has explained why such a combination of policies persists.
Though the last two questions may appear to be only vaguely related to
the first, when we attempt to answer them in Chapter III we will show
that there is a close relationship between the undermeasurement causing
the perceived shortage and the choice of policies to remedy it.
The literature testing theories of housing investment is quite
large. First, we will survey those analyses based on cross country
data, then those that work with time series and cross sectional data
on housing investment in the United States.
In the literature on housing investment across countries,
equations are fitted using simple linear models without explicit
theoretical underpinning. The studies attempt to explain the varia-
tion of the share of housing investment in Gross Domestic Product
(2) across nations with a series of such variables as income and
demographic characteristics. Occasionally miscellaneous additional
variables attempting to capture structural characteristics of the
economy are also included.
All authors found income, measured as Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita, the most important variable in explaining variation
in the share of housing investment in total production. In a compari-
son of data collected between 1951 and 1957 for twenty-six developing
and developed countries, Kuznets shows that both the share of construc-
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tion in Gross Domestic Product and the share of residential construction
in total construction increases with income per capita. In fact, one
can calculate from his data that the share of residential construction
in Gross Domestic Product increases with income per capita, from 2.7%
of GDP for the lowest income countries to 4.7% for the highest. (3)
Kuznets warns that "it may well be that the differences among groups of
countries in the distribution between residential and other construc-
tion merely reflect relative price differences and would disappear if
the estimates were converted to the same price structure" (Kuznets,
1960, p. 36). Thus, his earlier work does not conclusively show that
physical additions to the housing stock increase with income per capita.
Interestingly, in a later intertemporal study covering twelve de-
veloped countries between 1860 and 1955 Kuznets was unable to show a
relation between income per capita and the share of dwelling construc-
tion in GDP (Kuznets, 1961, p. 40, also Kuznets, 1976, p. 258).
Eckaus, using pooled time series cross section data for twenty-
five countries, clearly demonstrated a positive relation between hous-
ing investment per capita and income per capita (United Nations, De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs, 1973, p. 42). Strassmann, in
his study based on data for twenty-six countries between 1955 and 1966,
finds that the share of residential construction lags in poor countries,
accelerates in middle income countries and then falls off in the rich-
er developed countries, except in the developed European countries
where it levels off (Strassmann, 1970, p. 402). Strassmann attributes
this pattern to a measurement problem at low income levels and demand
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and supply shifts at higher income levels. According to him the level
of housing investment in developing countries is only low because most
of it is produced outside the monetized sector of the economy. In
middle income countries, high population growth rates and migration
rates push demand up while the supply expands easily. "Materials and
technology are largely domestic and relatively simple and both entre-
preneurs and workers can enter this industry with ease" (ibidem, p.
393). In richer countries lower population growth and migration rates
cause demand to slacken. Strassmann argues that the downturn in the
construction share of GDP in developed countries becomes more evident
when one corrects for the monopolistic component that strong unions
have added to the construction wage bill. One can assume that his re-
mark also applies to housing investment (ibidem, p. 394).
Burns and Grebler's work confirms Strassmann's findings. Running
a multivariate regression on a sample covering two periods: 1955-60
and 1960-65 for thirty-nine countries they found that the share of
housing investment in GDP, (H) (averaged over a certain time period)
is an inverted U-shaped function of GDP per capita. Even though they
included other variables in their regression, income per capita was
the major factor explaining the change in the share of housing invest-
ment (Burns and Grebler, 1977, p. 36). They account for their result
as follows. "At the earliest stages of economic development, H is low.
A relatively small share of total resources is allocated to housing
because other investments presumably yield higher expected returns.
With development, H rises as housing outbids many of the types of in-
- 56 -
vestment that were critical during the earliest development continuum,
H falls as alternative investments once again outbid housing" (ibidem,
p. 30). (A more detailed analysis of the work of Burns and Grebler
is found in Appendix C.) Of course, explaining the relationship on the
basis of yields only pushes the theoretical question back one step
further. The authors present no logical basis for assuming that yields
on housing vary with income per capita. Moreover they cite no evidence
supporting the hypothesis that yields change in the course of income
growth.
Most authors agree that besides income, demographic variables are
most important in explaining the difference in the share of housing
investment in GDP among countries. Both Kuznets and Strassmann point
out that the small share of housing investment in GDP in developed
countries is caused by low population growth rates (Kuznets, 1961, p.
40 and Strassmann, 1970, p. 393).
But Eckaus is the first to actually include demographic variables
in a regression equation explaining housing investment per capita. He
included the percentage of population in urban areas first because a
larger percentage of investment in urban areas is measured, also the
urban population can more effectively demand housing from the govern-
ment so they respond more readily to the needs of an urbanized popu-
lation. For logistic reasons, governments can more easily respond to
urban demands. Eckaus also added a variable measuring urban migration
rates because, since houses are not mobile, a shift in population can
cause an increase in the demand for housing investment. He included
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the total population as well but did not explain why (United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1973, p. 36). The results
of the regression confirm that all three demographic variables have a
significant positive effect on the level of housing investment per
capita (ibidem, p. 42).
In their model, Burns and Grebler include the population growth
rate and a measure of urban migration similar to that used by Eckaus,
on the grounds that these variables measure need (and presumably thus
influence demand) (Burns and Grebler, 1977, p. 25). However, the re-
gression results do not indicate that those variables have a significant
effect on the share of housing investment in GDP. (ibidem, p. 29). The
results are open to doubt because the demographic variables are mis-
specified. We would argue that changes in household size should be
included along with population growth, and leaving one of these varia-
bles out of the equation means that none of the coefficients estimates
need be consistent. Although other authors mention the desirability
of adding explanatory variables other than income or demographic
indicators, only Eckaus has included some in his model. He included
the number of persons per room because high densities would promote
greater willingness to invest in housing. Two other variables were
added because they reflect taste for housing. A variable measuring
education was inclur-d because higher education levels enhance the
desirability of housing. A health variable, infant mortality, was
also included on the grounds that if people see a causal relation be-
tween the current state of the housing stock and their health, then the
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lower are health standards, the greater will be investment in housing
to remedy the situation. The coefficients of all these additional
variables were significant: the sign on density was positive as ex-
pected, while those on education and health variables were the opposite
of what was expected. Eckaus attributes this puzzling result to the
fact that education and health probably enter in on the supply side
because investment in these areas can crowd out investment in housing.
This result simply underlies an important point. Equation such as
Eckaus was estimating are a type of reduced form, and the coefficient
estimates must be interpreted as such (United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 1973, p. 37, 41, 42).
Strassmann proposes that the terms of mortgage finance ought to
be included in a theory explaining housing investment, but does not
use that variable in his regression (Strassmann, 1970, p. 395).
Burns and Grebler list a few of the relevant variables which
they had to exclude from their model of housing investment. The ex-
tent of public assistance to housing was left out because "it varies
widely among countries and does not lend itself to quantification"
(Burns and Grebler, 1977, p. 36). Burns and Grebler are also convinced
that climatic differences affect the share of housing investment be-
cause in tropical countries a dwelling with performance values equal
to those in cold weather climates can be produced at lower costs.
However, they did not include a climate variable in their model (ibidem,
p. 37).
Existing cross country literature has not yet satisfactorily an-
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swered the questions formulated at the end of Chapter I concerning the
effects of policies on housing investment. Variables such as construc-
tion cost, the extent of public intervention, and the availability of
housing finance which should have been part of a fully specified model
were mentioned butnever included. Besides inadequately specifying the
explanatory variables in the equations, existing work also uses a de-
pendent variable which, even if perfectly explained, cannot shed light
on the questions we would like to answer. All the authors used a
measure of housing investment that does not separate the number of
dwellings produced from the resources used per new dwelling, which
makes it impossible to distinguish the effects of trend and policy
variables on each of those. Finally, the undermeasurement of housing
production is an acknowledged problem. Such a systematic bias in the
data certainly puts into doubt the results of existing empirical work.
In fairness to the earlier authors, we would like to stress that
the original purpose of these investigations was quite different from
ours. They were developed to provide planners with simple rules of
thumb to calculate a reasonable level of investment given values of
widely available aggregate economic variables. Thus to serve their
purpose, such models had to use simple specifications. An important
shortcoming of these models is that if one uses them to calculate
optimal housing investment levels, one must assume that the other
countries in the sample invested wisely. An even more important
weakness of these models for policy making is that though they may
give a reasonable forecast of investment or an approximate target for
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investment, their simple specification precludes their shedding light
on the direct means for achieving these objectives. What is needed
in order to address this issue is a suitably elaborated theory of hous-
ing investment and estimates of the values of structural parameters
that will permit tracing through the effects of different policy
options.
Having reviewed the cross country literature on housing invest-
ment, we now propose to briefly discuss some of the literature on
housing investment in the United States. This literature can be
divided into studies explaining the variation in housing starts and
those explaining the variation in the price of new homes.
Most of the empirical studies of housing starts were done for the
purpose of understanding the movement over the business cycle of one
of the more volatile components of investment. Hence they focus on
short term fluctuations of starts, These are shown to be influenced
by policy variables, especially by the availability of mortgage credit
(Modigliani and Lessard, 1975, p. 98). However, we are interested
primarily in long run time series analysis since that type of result
is relevant to the questions we are asking.
Maisel (1963) made one of the first attempts at modeling long
run demand for new housing. He finds that demand is a function of
household formation and losses (demolitions plus conversions to other
uses). He argues that short run fluctuations of investment are de-
termined on the supply side (fluctuations in inventories and
vacancies).
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In their study of housing in the United States for the period
1915 through 1968, Arcelus and Meltzer (1973) study the determinants
of demand and supply of new dwelling units. The significant variables
determining supply are the price of housing (using the Boeckh index),
production costs, the real labor cost of construction, and the market
rate of interest. The significant determinants of demand are interest
rates, rental prices, a measure of wealth and a measure of owners'
equity. However, they "find no evidence that the demand for or supply
of housing increases with the stock or flow of mortgage credit,"
(1973, p. 97). Arcelus and Meltzer's findings also suggest that in a
stable growing economy the number of housing starts increases faster
than population (and even the size and quality of housing units in-
creases relative to population). "There is no evidence of a long run
housing problem nor is there evidence that mortgage or housing policies
are required to encourage production or purchases" (ibidem). This
quote indicates that the authors define a housing problem as an aggre-
gate shortfall of dwellings. However they did not control for house-
hold size in their demand equations, and this may account for the
finding that housing starts increase faster than population. Failing
to control for household size also weakens their conclusion that there
is no long run housing problem.
Meltzer (1974) in his study of the effect of credit availability
in housing markets concludes that it has a short, but not long run
effect on the demand for housing. He bases this conclusion on the
observation that between 1912 and 1958 the ratio of housing to total
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assets held by non-farm households has stayed roughly constant while
the ratio of mortgage debt to housing has doubled. Although the con-
stancy of the share of housing assets in total assets is somewhat
puzzling, Meltzer has not proven that there is no relation between the
level of housing debt and the demand for housing. It is quite possible
that an increase in demand for housing assets brought about by increas-
ing housing debt will be accompanied by increases in demand for other
assets. Or some other variable determining long run housing demand
such as the population growth rate may fall and thus produce an effect
offsetting that brought about by mortgage debt increases. Meltzer's
evidence is no stronger than would be the result of running a univariate
regression. His point that the overall assets market equilibrium may
influence the effectiveness of government mortgage policy is well
taken however, and should be explored further. Nonetheless, he has
not provided a strong test of his hypothesis.
The literature on cross sectional analysis of housing demand is
extensive and has recently been reviewed by Mayo (1979). We will not
attempt to replicate this careful and thorough research. Rather we
will extract from his review the conclusions relevant to our work.
First, studies are divided according to whether they use data for in-
dividual households or more aggregated data (groups of households in
different locations). Then Mayo divides the studies according to the
functional form of the estimated equations, log linear versus any
other specification.
All the studies try to explain housing expenditure by renters and
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owners as a function of income, price and demographic variables. The
data on housing expenditure are either the purchase price of dwell-
ings or rental expenditure. To measure income, most authors use
either current income or some approximation of permanent income. On
the income variable, Mayo concludes that "for a wide range of analyses
employing different data bases (4) and methodologies, the permanent
income elasticity of demand is well below one on average" (ibidem, p.
25). In fact, most estimates were between 0.3 and 0.7 (ibidem, p.
12).
Until recently few studies have included a price term. The
biases this omission causes have been discussed in Polinsky (1975)
and Polinsky and Ellwood (1977). Their estimates indicate that these
biases can be considerable. Those studies including price take their
price data from a number of different sources. Most authors obtain
the price of housing from published data: house prices from Federal
Housing Administration data, ownership costs or rental cost indeces
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics or the Boeckh indeces of
residential construction costs. Only a few authors estimate prices
from secondary information. Polinsky and Ellwood (1977) estimate the
unit price of housing using data on housing expenditure, the unit price
of land, the quantity of land, and the unit price of capital. First
they estimate a production function for housing, and transform it into
a cost function. They then calculate prices for individual houses by
substituting factor prices for each individual home into the cost
equation. Straszheim (1973) calculates housing prices in different
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areas of his sample by estimating hedonic price equations for each
area and then substituting in attributes of some prototypical home
to determine prices for each area, Regarding estimates of price
elasticities, Mayo concludes that "price elasticity estimates are very
sensitive to both the source of the price data and to model specifica-
tion" (1979, p. 12). Nonetheless the price elasticity "appears to be
less than one in absolute value" (ibidem, p. 25).
Many of the cross sectional studies include demographic variables
such as race, sex of household head, and household size. The last
variable is the only one of interest in the context of a cross country
analysis. Even though three out of four analyses May reviewed estimat-
ed a statistically significant positive relationship between household
size and housing expenditure, Mayo concludes that the effect of the
household size is ambiguous because other analyses he did not review
suggest that housing expenditure first increases with household size
and then decreases (ibidem, p. 21).
Even in the extensive literature on housing investment in the
United States, no studies estimate separate equations for the number
of units and the quality of units. Kearl remarks on the usefulness
of this distinction, and further argues that the number of units may
be insensitive to all but demographic variables. Response to relative
prices will be in the type and quality of housing produced (Kearl,
1979, p. 1116). Unfortunately he does not test this hypothesis.
Our discussion of existing work in the area of housing investment
has brought out the gaps in the literature, both in terms of the focus
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of the studies and the methodology used. Our work is designed to res-
pond to these gaps, first by specifying a theoretically based struc-
tural model for a cross country regression, and second by allowing for
possible effects of policy variables in this specification.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II
(1) Stalin had "removed" the radicals, had appropriated their ideas
and applied them ruthlessly (Erlich, 1967).
(2) Eckaus uses the investment in housing per capita instead (Eckaus,
1973).
(3) The percentage of GDP devoted to residential construction is
calculated from the share of gross domestic capital formation in GDP
(Kuznets, 1960, p. 4) and the share of dwelling construction in gross
domestic capital formation (Kuznets, 1960, p. 33).
(4) The data refer to individual househoulds or groups of households
in different locations.
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III. THE NATURE OF THE HOUSING PROBLEM
In Chapter I, we described the apparent conflict between two
views of housing conditions in poor countries. Some observers argue
that almost all households do find a dwelling through the homes many
families can afford are often quite primitive. On the other hand,
governments express concern over a housing shortage indicated to them
by a severe shortfall in measured housing production relative to re-
quirements.
As we related in Chapter I policymakers carefully compare the
increase in households with the production of new dwellings. The
estimates of the number of new households are reliable, being based
on estimates of population growth and household size both of which
are measured reasonably accurately and consistently over time in
censuses and sample surveys. Housing production data is often deemed
just about as reliable. Production is measured by the number of
permits. requested from the government to either start building a
dwelling or inhabit a completed one (1). In collecting those data the
government can take a purely passive role because citizens are obliged
by laws and regulations to obtain such permits, and thus report their
production. Production data are collected by the institution issuing
permits, which is often also the branch of government responsible for
housing or physical planning or both.
The ethnographic view of the housing situation is also based
on convincing evidence, even though this evidence is quite different
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in nature. The administrative view is derived from a single set of
figures while the ethnographic view draws its conclusions by taking a
holistic view of the housing situation, and building a composite image
from a great variety of information sources. Among these are casual
visits through residential areas, in depth anthropological surveys of
neighborhoods and their inhabitants, informal interviews with poor and
rich, careful examination of a time series of aerial photographs or
visits of settlements spaced over time.
The government's prehension of the housing situation is based on
abstract, arithmetic data. Such information is not strictly com-
parable with the eclectically assembled evidence which informs the
more "gestalt" ethnographic view. The only hope of making sense of
the conflict between the two views is to find a third, independent data
source which might help reconcile them. Fortunately, there is such a
third source of information, also collected by the government but
usually overlooked in their assessment of the housing situation. This
is the housing component of population censuses. It gives estimates
of the housing stock and reference to data from succeeding censuses
gives the growth in the housing stock.
Why governments do not rely more on censuses to evaluate the
housing situation is not altogether clear. It could be because cen-
suses are collected less frequently, usually every ten years, and
hence do not provide up to date information. It could also be that
the branch of the government in charge of housing is distant in an
organizational, bureaucratic sense from the institution responsible
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for the census. The latter are often very independent and only re-
sponsible to the presidency, the prime minister, or some other high
office (2). Still, representatives of the ministries concerned with
housing are usually consulted during the preparation of a census, and
they must thus have an interest in the results. The housing authori-
ties may have some reasons for failing to take account of census data
in their public declarations on the housing shortage.
Because censuses are held only at long intervals, any systematic
error in housing production statistics will have accumulated to con-
siderable divergences from the actual stock by the time the results of
the next census are published. The discrepancy between the two
housing stock estimates may be so large that the housing ministry will
ignore the census data in order to avoid admitting this mistake, or
simply conclude that the census data is incorrect. In Egypt, for
instance, the census results indicated that the larger housing
shortage calculated by the Ministry of Housing (see Chapter I) did
not exist and that enough dwellings had been built to keep the person
per room ratio constant, or even improve it slightly (Arab Republic
of Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 1976).
Yet this rather overwhelming evidence has not deterred the Ministry
of Housing from continuing to use the huge shortage figures as a
justification for policy. Quite recently, a World Bank publication
presented the standard administrative view of housing deficits based
uniquely on production data. According to this view Egypt has a
deficit of 1.5 million dwellings. On the facing page, they quote the
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most recent (1976) census for other purposes, yet there is no mention
of the fact that census estimates of the housing stock indicate no
noticeable deficit (Ikram, 1980, p. 148-49).
We cannot directly document other cases where the government fails
to take account of census data in their published assessments of the
housing situation, but we can present some indications that this is
not an isolated phenomenon. First as we will show later, a large
discrepancy between census figures and official production figures can
be found in many countries. Second, we have found and quoted a number
of government publications that declare a shortage on the basis of
production data with no mention of whether or not census data indicates
that the shortage is more or less acute. Furthermore, as we mentioned
in Chapter I, the United Nations has confirmed that the shortfall in
housing production is a global problem, and the deficit they calculate
is clearly based on production statistics without any of the qualifica-
tions that census data would suggest.
Of course, one could always argue that the governments publicize
the housing problem as an aggregate shortage based on production
figures, but that privately they do take the census data into account,
and they do see that the housing problem is more complex than simple
aggregate deficits. Of course, any mustering of concrete evidence can
be brushed off this way, but short of reliable lie detector tests for
housing ministers a debate of this type cannot be resolved. In any
case, this debate simply deflects attention from a more important
issue. No matter how complex the governments' view of the situation
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may be, we are only interested in their view of the situation insofar
as it influences the policy action they take based on this view. We
contend that if the administrative, arithmetic shortage view of the
housing situation, even if it is only part of the governments' percep-
tion of the problem, affects the policy response, then it is important
to ascertain whether or not this view is correct.
The question of how official proclamations of deficits and the
bureaucratically collected production data that underlie them really
affect policy design and implementation is actually a very complex
one. To answer it would be a study in itself. In fact a new branch
of applied anthropology, enumerology, concerns itself entirely with
answering questions of this sort. Briefly states, enumerology is
the "study of the social processes by which numbers are generated and
the effect of these processes on behaviour and thought," (Bogdan and
Ksander, 1980, p. 302). (3) We cannot pretent to have the expertise
in this field necessary to treat the above stated question properly
and we will not do so. Rather, we will make the assumption that the
perceived housing deficits calculated on the basis of official
statistics, albeit only a part of the governments' view, do have an
effect on government action, and thus are worthy of attention. We
feel that maintaining this hypothesis is not unreasonable given the
regularity of the appearance of proclamations of arithmetic deficits
in public documents. We find it hard to be so cynical as to assume
that governments persist in discussing issues to which they only
intend to pay lip service.
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To return now to our principal task of reconciling the conflict-
ing views of the housing situation, let us compare the information
conveyed by the two independent sources of information that are avail-
able. What we find is that census data supports the ethnographic view
of housing, the number of houses keeps up quite well with the number
of households, while official production statistics support the
administrative view. The fact that two statistical sources disagree
indicates a bias in at least one of them. Once the source of the bias
is located, we can decide which of the two parties to the original
debate is wrong, and perhaps understand why.
Both measurements have biases but we have reason to believe that
those of the census are considerably less. The government has a man-
date, often specified in the constitution, to actively seek out and
count all members of the population. In almost all countries, count-
ing every dwelling has been added to this mandate. Furthermore, locat-
ing all dwellings is instrumental to locating the population. So
governments go to great pains and expense to assure that their coverage
of the housing stock is truly comprehensive. During the preparation
of the census the country is divided into tracts and, with the help
of aerial photographs and up to date maps each possible living quarter
is assigned to a census taker. Then those same documents are used to
cross check completed census reports. As evidence that the counting
of the census stock is not only intended to be exhaustive but is also
successful at this task, sample evaluations of the U.S. census accuracy
indicate that undercounting in the 1970 census is approximately 2.5
- 73 -
percent (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1973, p. 3).
One might argue that though the census is exhaustive, it could
never indicate a housing shortage or surplus, because all premises in-
habited by a household could be called a dwelling or all inhabitants
of a dwelling could be classified as one household. Fortunately the
definition of dwellings and households are independent so that an
aggregate housing shortage or surplus could easily show up in census
results. Almost all censuses distinguish between a household and the
inhabitants of the same dwelling. According to the definition of the
United Nations, which is used with minor modifications in most coun-
tries, a household may be either "a) a one person household - that is,
a person who makes provision for his own food or other essentials for
living without combining with any other person to form part of a
multiperson household or b) a multiperson household - that is, a group
of two or more persons who make common provision for food or other
essentials for living. The persons in the group may pool their incomes
and have a common budget to a greater or lesser extent; they may be
related or unrelated persons or a combination of both. Households
usually occupy the whole, part of, or in some cases, more than one
housing unit, but they may also be found in camps, in boarding houses
or hotels, or as administrative personnel in institutions, or they may
be homeless" (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
1976, p. 4). The definition of a dwelling (4) is, except for improvis-
ed housing, independent of how many households inhabit it; a dwelling
may for that matter even be vacant (ibidem, p. 8). This is expressed
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most clearly in the United Nations definition of living quarters, which
included hotels, motels, inns, boarding houses, pensions, and lodging
houses in addition to dwellings. "Living quarters are structurally
separate and independent places of abode: a) they may have been con-
structed, built, converted, or arranged for human habitation, provided
that they are not at the time of the census used wholly for other
purposes and that, in the case of mobile housing units, improvised
housing units, and living quarters other than housing units, they are
occupied at the time of the census, or b) although not intended for
habitation, they may actually be in use as such at the time of the
census. The essential feature of living quarters are separateness and
independence. An enclosure may be considered as separate if surrounded
by walls, fenses, etc., and covered by a roof, so that a person, or
group of persons, can be isolated from other persons in the community
for the purpose of sleeping, preparing and taking their meals, or
protecting themselves from the hazards of climate and environment.
Such an enclosure may be considered as independent when it has direct
access from the street or from a public or communal staircase, passage,
gallery, or grounds, i.e., when the occupants can come in or go out of
their living quarter without passing through anybody else's premises."
(ibidem, p. 6).
The collection of housing production data differs substantially
from the census taking process. The emphasis on comprehensiveness of
the data is far less, and information is gathered passively rather
than actively. In fact the data collection is only a by-product of the
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bureaucratic process of granting building permits. The logic implicit
in this data collection procedure is that only new housing meeting the
standards specified in the housing regulations is worthy of its name
and can thus be considered an addition to the housing stock. We call
this way of defining housing the template view because to sort out
"housing" from other unacceptable dwelling construction, an imaginary
template is applied to constructions, and if they don't fit, they
are rejected. The multidimensional template is composed of the quality
and size specifications contained in the housing code. Sub-standard
housing production is certain to be systematically ignored. That is a
bias in the production data which we will discuss later in more detail.
Another bias derives from the passivity inherent in the procedure
of waiting for builders to come in and report production. If the
bureaucratic structure is sufficiently convoluted to make the process
of obtaining permits very costly in and of itself, even if a home meets
the regulations, the builder may not bother getting a permit. High and
certain bureaucratic costs may be avoided at the risk of incurring
fines for noncompliance whose expected value is quite low when en-
forcement is weak.
' Production data based on permits would not be a problem if codes
were always followed. But they generally are not, and the magnitude
of the undercounting bias will be a function of how realistic the
regulations are in a particular context and how stringently they are
enforced. The regulations tend to be very unrealistic for poor
countries for two reasons. First the standards for individual dwell-
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ings require such a high level of resource use that a large proportion
of households can never afford homes meeting code requirements. In
fact, regulations on minimal specifications for housing appear to
vary less across countries than income. Oftentimes regulations in
poor countries are simply vestiges of the colonial occupation, more
suited to the conditions in the home country not the old colony.
Also, when physical planners are trained in countries richer than their
own they often return thinking that it is best to apply the practices
and values they have learned aborad. Whether remnants from the past
or consequences of recent acculturation, the requirements of building
laws and regulations are such that in many poor countries only the
rich have the resources to build dwellings qualifying for a building
permit.
The template view of housing dictates more than a building of
a certain quality. It also insists upon adherence to requirements that
even the richest households may have trouble satisfying. In many
cases permits can only be given for building in approved subdivisions
on land zoned for residential use. But in poorer countries the
physical planning authorities lack the resources to plan, zone, and
subdivide urban areas at a rate consistent with the growth of demand
for residential land, Besides meeting zoning regulations, newly built
homes must also meet certain requirements regarding access to utilities
such as water supply, sewage disposal and electricity. But in many
countries government institutions hold the monopoly on the provision
of utilities. In the poorer countries, these monopolies often cannot
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provide those utilities to keep pace with urban growth, either because
they do not have the financial or construction capacity, or because
they are legally compelled to wait for the physical planning authori-
ties to produce the urban layout. So, in the case of zoning regula-
tion and utilities, the government itself may prevent even those who
could satisfy conditions on housing specifications from obtaining
building permits.
The fact that the governments of poor countries are not able to
provide the physical plans and utilities that their own building regu-
lations require is not an isolated phenomenon. Governments of poor
countries that promulgate compulsory education laws are often not
able to build enough schools or train enough teachers. Many govern-
ments find it hard to enforce their laws and regulations outside the
large urban centers. In fact, governments are generally only able to
penetrate societies slowly, as their revenues and national income in-
crease (Pye, 1966, p. 64). Penetration is the name given to a multi-
faceted process of development of the role of government in the life
of the populace. The essence of the transformation lies in the govern-
ment increasing the number and intensity of the types of ties it has
with its citizens. Once established, this multi-stranded relationship
with the citizenry helps the government to become a coherent force at
all levels in the society. Its interventions can be made more re-
sponsive to conditions in the country and it has the means, not just
financial but also political, to make regulations and practice con-
sistent.
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There are two principal reasons why penetration deepens with in-
come. First, as income grows government revenues tend to grow more
than proportionally so governments have more resources available to
them. These can be used not only to enforce compliance with regula-
tions but also to provide a high level of services that are available
only to citizens "with all papers in order". These other services
provide incentives to obey regulations set down by the government.
Second, quite simply, as national income grows, household incomes rise
high enough to make meeting the standards the authorities set afford-
able for most households, thus more likely to be chosen voluntarily.
In the case of housing in poor countries, one might say that the
low level of penetration is fortunate because it coincides with a
large discrepancy between the demands of the template view of housing
and the resources of both the private sector and the government to
satisfy them. If governments had the power to prevent anybody who
could not satisfy all the requirements from building, a severe housing
shortage would ensue.
We have now discussed in detail both the nature and causes of
bias in the two sources of data available on housing production. The
difference between the reliability of housing censuses and housing
production figures is clear. Censuses are by intention comprehensive.
The definition in the census procedure is also based on a standard for
an acceptable house, but that standard is much lower than that re-
quired for a dwelling to be counted in production statistics. This
means that almost every structure people use as a dwelling will be
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counted, because the standard is much closer than the template standard
to what the poorest household actually inhabits. Thus census standards
lead to a truer assessment of the situation by counting more dwellings.
Using higher standards, fewer dwellings are counted, so production
statistics tend to present the situation as one where many households
do not have a dwelling of their own, when in actuality they do have a
dwelling, even though it may be of very low quality.
Of course, censuses are not perfectly accurate. In poor countries
they will be less detailed and may have more small errors, but they
will not have the systematic large bias that housing production has.
To estimate the extent of this bias we will compare the increase in the
dwelling stock between two censuses with the sum of the official annual
production figures over the same period. The results of this compari-
son can be found in Table 3.1 where we have calculated the ratio be-
tween official production and the change in stock. The result is
striking and confirms our hypothesis that the undermeasurement of
housing production is a problem that diminishes as income increases.
It may seem puzzling that in developed countries the ratio between the
official production and the increase in the stock (hereafter Ratio) is
larger than one. One has to keep in mind that the increase in the
stock is a measurement net of losses; it ignores demolitions, losses
caused by fire, flood, wind storms, war and earthquates and conversion
to non-residential uses. For a given housing stock, and a constant
rate of demolition of that stock, the share of production devoted to
net additions will fall with the rate of stock growth. For example,
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Table: 3.1 Ratio between the number of units officially produced between
two censuses and the increase in the housing stock between
the same censuses.
GDP per Capita at Ratio: Official Hous-
Period the end of the ing'Production/ChangeCountry Concerned Period (1) US $ in Stock (2)
Philippines 1960-67 220 0.14
Syria 1960-70 265 0.72
Egypt 1964-76 390 0.28
Colombia 1964-73 454 0.36
Brazil 1969-72 617 0.18
Yugoslavia 1961-71 718 1.20
Panama 1960-70 729 0.40
Costa Rica 1963-73 817 0.52
Chile 1960-70 887 0.56
Spain 1960-70 1,097 0,80
Venezuela 1961-71 1,196 0.22
Greece 1961-71 1,247 0.81
Poland 1960-70 1,350 1.59
Japan 1963-68 1,410 1.02
Ireland 1961-71 1,530 2.00
Hungary 1963-73 1,850 1.51
United Kingdom 1961-66 1,947 1.98
Czechoslovakia 1961-70 2,120 1.77
Finland 1960-70 2,251 1.56
France 1962-68 2,494 1.24
Belgium 1961-70 2,652 2.39
Netherlands 1960-71 2,805 1.55
New Zealand 1961-71 2,862 1.37
Norway 1960-70 2,883 1.64
Denmark 1965-70 3,159 1.27
Australia 1961-71 3,218 0.85
Switzerland 1960-70 3,409 1.06
Sweden 1960-70 4,109 1.84
Germany 1968-72 4,200 1.92
Canada 1961-71 4,328 0.93
United States 1960-70 4,789 1.61
Notes:
1. Source: World Bank, 1980, Economic Data Sheet I, for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
see Appendix B.
2. Source for housing stock data for all countries: United Nations, Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, 1973 and 1976. Except for Colombia, Republica de Colombia, Depart-
mento Administration National di Estadistica, 1977.
Sources for official dwelling production: United Nations, Department of InternationalEconomic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, Yearbook of Construction Statistics,
various years and United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 1971. Exceptions are
listed below:
Egypt: 1969-74; Arab Republic of Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and
Statistics, Statistical Handbook, various years. 1975-76: idem for urban housing, for
rural housing we used the same production level as 1974.
Costa Rica: 1963-66; Republica de Dosta Rica, Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda,
various years.
Venezuela: 1961-65; Republica de Venezuela, Ministero de Fomento, Direccion General de
Estadistica y Censos Nacionales, various years and private communications from Professor
Hugo Manzanilla, Instituto de Urbanismo, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas.
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in a country where the housing stock increases at 3 percent, where the
demolition rate is 2 percent, if housing production is accurately
measured, the Ratio would be 1.67. A higher Ratio means a lower house-
hold growth rate or a higher loss rate or both.
The ratio between official production and the increase in the
stock varies from 0.16 for the Philippines to 2.39 for Belgium. The
result for Belgium is not surprising, it has a low rate of household
growth. The low values of Ratio such as 0.16 for the Philippines
have to be regarded as underestimates of the bias in the production
data because the denominator of Ratio omits demolition and other losses.
In the case of the Philippines for instance, after correcting for
losses the Ratio would probably be closer to 0.10 (5). This would
mean that only around 10 percent of the total number of units produced
is measured.
Using the data in Table 3.1, we can test the hypothesis that the
undermeasurement is caused by the lack of penetration of government in
society. There are no ready measurements of penetration but if pene-
tration rises with income then income can be used as a proxy. First
we set up the following identity.
AS = OFF + UNM - DEM
where AS = change in the stock
OFF = official number of residential units produced
UNM = unmeasured number of units produced
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DEM = demolitions
All these variables refer to the same time interval. From these
we obtain
OFF = AS - UNM + DEM (1)
We divide both sides of the equation by AS
OFF _ AS - UNM + DEM (2)
AS AS AS
Now we assume that AS JNM is a function of income per capita. Since
we have no a priori knowledge of the fonn of this function we will
specify it as a linear function. However because AS - UNM is bounded
between 0 and 1 and asymptotes to one we have also tried the equation
with the logarithm of GDPCAP. We also assume that the demolition
rate is constant, as if demolitions were random events with equal
probability. Equation (2) then becomes
R =a + bGDPCAP - a-
where R = ratio of official housing units production to change in
the housing stock
a = the demolition rate
S = the stock of housing
GDPCAP = Gross Domestic Product per capita
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Equation (3) can also be written:
R = a + bY-a (4)
S
where S is the growth rate in the housing stock. We then estimated
Equation (4) with a sample of 28 countries (see Table 3.1). (The
sources of the data are described in Appendix A .)
The results of the regression are shown in Table 3-2. The co-
efficients of both income and the inverse of stock change are both
strongly significant and have the right signs. The coefficient on in-
come is low but this is more or less what was expected. Thus, in-
sofar as income is positively related to penetration, the results of
this regression support our hypothesis that the measurement of produc-
tion rises with the penetration of government in society.
Penetration into housing activity may depend not only on the level
of income but also on a number of other variables such as the nature
of the political organizations, the effectiveness of civil administra-
tion and the responsibilities assumed by the central government.
Furthermore such problems as ethnic strife, terrorist activities,
economic instability, and rapid population growth all put strain on
governments and lessen their ability to put policy consistently into
practice. However most of these variables are quite difficult to
measure and aggregating their effects consistently across countries,
even if data were available, would be impossible. Nonetheless we
can try to capture the effects of these strains on government with one
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Table: 3.2 Regression Results: Ratio of measured housing produc-
tion to change in housing stock (RATIO) on income per capita (GDPCAP),
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of these variables for which international data is readily available,
population growth.
Rapid population growth strains the government by increasing demand
for social services such as health and education. When the structure
of the population changes rapidly, demands for different goods may shift
abrubtly. If the private sector does not foresee the changes and adapt
supplies in consequence, the government may have to devote a good deal
of its attention and resources to averting critical shortages. With
a rapidly growing work force as a constituency, the authorities may
also have to devote more attention to organizing the economy to provide
sufficient jobs than to accurate measurement of existing activity.
Adding population growth, Equation (4) then becomes
R = a + bGDPCAP + cP - a (5)
S
where P is equal to the population growth rate. The results presented in
Table 3-2 and 3-3 indicate that it is reasonable to assume that, as
income grows, government will be able to measure actual production more
accurately. On the other hand, the penetration of government into the
housing sector will be retarded by the pressure of population growth.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient on population growth
is much higher than the coefficient on income. This suggests that
social pressures on government outweigh the slow progress in the
penetration that results from income growth.
Regarding the point estimate of a, the demolition rate, the low
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Table: 3.3 Regression Results: Ratio of measured housing production
to change in housing stock (RATIO) on income per capita (GDPCAP), the
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value of .00733 indicates that if all houses in the stock are identi-
cal, are equally distributed according to asset age, the stock is in
a steady state, then asset life is 135 years. There is no particular
reason to believe, however, that we are examining steady states in
these countries. In fact Equation (5) is not defined if S = 0.
Therefore this argument does not detract from the plausibility of the
coefficient. Since S is positive the larger cohort of newer units in
the stock implies that the demolition rate can be low, without implying
that the average age of assets is as high as 135 years.
We have explored the bias in production figures and tried to ex-
plain them systematically. We will now examine the housing shortages
or surpluses indicated by the more accurate census data, by comparing
the number of households and the number of dwellings. Such a compari-
son is made in Table 3.4. From this table it appears that in general
poorer countries have a small shortage and richer countries have a
surplus. For instance in Brazil, which has the worst shortage, eight
percent of households do not have a dwelling.
A word of caution is necessary here. In our conclusions, we are
implicitly defining a shortage as the aggregate amount by which the
number of households exceeds the number of dwellings. This may be a
very simple definition but it is drawn directly from the discussion of
the housing shortage in poorer countries and by U.N. agencies, some
of which was cited in Chapter I. One could argue that this aggregate
definition of a shortage masks a number of other types of important
housing deficits for example, deficites of certain types of housing,
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Table: 3.4 Comparison of the number of dwellings with the number of households.
GDP per Ratio: Dwellings
Capita Number of Number of Divided by
Name Year (1) Dwellings (2) Households (2) Households
Philippines 1967 220 5,234,000 5,234,000 0.98
Syrian A.R. 1970 265 1,030,365 1,060,690 0.97
Egypt 1976 390 7,311,139 7,351,538 0.99
Columbia 1973 454 3,809,950 (3) 3,958,203 (3) 0.96
Brazil 1970 496 17,643,387 19,104,086 0.92
Yoguslavia 1971 718 5,206,249 5,375,384 0.97
Panama 1970 729 288,768 287,768 1.00
Costa Rica 1973 817 332,212 330,857 (4) 1.00
Chile 1970 887 1,689,780 1,689,840 1.00
Venezuela 1971 1,196 2,126,921 1,844,078 (5) 1.15
Greece 1971 1,247 3,086,020 2,556,180 1.21
Japan 1968 1,410 25,900,600 25,484,812 1.02
Ireland 1971 1,530 709,360 730,543 0.97
Hungary 1973 1,850 3,353,800 3,351,937 1.00
United Kingdom 1966 1,947 17,622,033 17,747,119 0.99
Finland 1970 2,251 1,463,221 1,518,821 0.96
Czechoslovakia 1970 2,302 4,284,280 4,632,411 0.92
France 1968 2,494 18,228,576 15,762,508 1.16
Belgium 1970 2,652 3,228,000 3,232,710 1.00
Netherlands 1971 2,805 3,659,870 3,733,000 0.98
New Zealand 1966 2,862 724,444 717,273 1.01
Norway 1970 2,883 1,296,718 1,296,718 1.00
Denmark 1970 3,159 1,800,654 1,849,942 0.97
Australia 1971 3,218 4,033,616 3,672,949 1.10
Switzerland 1970 3,409 2,218,863 2,051,592 1.08
Sweden 1970 4,109 3,181,239 3,050,354 1.04
Germany (W) 1972 4,200 21,392,000 22,254,000 0.96
Canada 1971 4,328 6,342,275 6,041,305 1.05
United States 1970 4,789 68,679,030 63,449,747 1.08
Notes:
1. Source: World Bank, 1980, Economic Data Sheet I. (For Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland, see Appendix B.)
2. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1976 and 1973.
(For exceptions see further footnotes.)
3. Soucre: Republica de Colombia, Departmento Administration National di Estadistica,
1977, p. 40.
4. Source: Republica de Costa Rica, 1973.
5. Source: Republica de Venezuela, 1973.
- 89 -
or, of housing in particular regions among others. But we also note
that when there is no aggregate deficit, sub-deficits must be accom-
panied but sub-surpluses. Though we do not have the evidence to prove
that this state of affairs never occurs, we find it implausible that
substantial sub-deficits and sub-surpluses would persit in the long
run. This is because it seems highly likely that households would
prefer to substitute another type of dwelling for that type which is
in short supply than to go without any house at all.
Furthermore, sub-shortages could be elaborated ad infinitum, yet
one might not consider all of them unsatisfactory outcomes. Housing
shortages can be classified according to the amount of adjustment
households either do make or are expected to make. Our definition of
a shortage assumes that households will or at least should be ready to
shuffle themselves about throughout the country so as to eliminate long
run shortages. It could be argued that people should not be expected
to move anywhere in the country but only within a certain radius. This
simply raises more questions however. Should families be forced to
leave their region? Their city? Their neighborhood? How long should
they have to spend looking or waiting for a home? Years? Months?
Weeks? For policy making, there are no a priori answers to these
questions because the response to them depends on the moral standards
being applied to the outcome, and the analysis of how these standards
are chosen is outside the scope of this thesis. Our purpose here is to
show that, as defined in current debates, the arithmetic housing
deficit is not as acute as claimed. Therefore, housing policy should
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not be directed to remedying a false problem. Rather efforts should be
devoted to defining shortages in a fashion suited to the priorities
and capacities of the country and then assessing their magnitude. More-
over we argue that shortages even narrowly defined, may not be the only,
or the most important housing problem. The critical problem is that a
large fraction of the population cannot afford decent housing. That
situation could be called a shortage of housing of an acceptable
standard, but to do so would simply divert attention from the crux of
the problem which we feel lies in low incomes. And as we have seen in
Chapter I, trying to provide the decent houses necessary to eliminate
the shortages will not necessarily ensure that poor families will be
able to afford to live in them.
While trying to understand why governments have declared housing
crises, it became apparent that the strict template view of acceptable
housing had played a crucial role in the undermeasurement of production,
and thus the inaccurate assessment of the housing situation.
Perceiving a housing deficit spurs governments to intervene in the
housing sector. The template view plays a role as well, by dictating
the proper form of such intervention. In Chapter I we argued that
governments in poorer countries choose to intervene in housing primarily
with a direct supply policy. But every dwelling the government does
provide must fit the template. Public housing must thus meet high
standards in terms of size, construction specification, and land use
as well as complying with all regulations regarding zoning and connec-
tion to utilities. The resources required just to build dwellings
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according to these standards are staggering.
In Table 3.5 we have calculated the implications of building all
new dwellings according to the quality standards of public housing.
We have measured the resource requirement by taking the construction
cost of public housing governments have actually built and multiplying
that amount by the required yearly construction, the increase in the
number of households plus two percent of the existing stock for re-
placements. The table shows that such a program would entail housing
production several times the actual construction output of the coun-
tries. It would also represent an inordinately large share of both
GDP and total government expenditure (6). In Table 3.5, we have also
shown what governments would be able to build given their current
housing budgets. The results are as one would expect: governments
would be able to produce but a small percentage of the countries'
yearly housing requirements (in our examples an average 4 percent).
Given this constraint on available resources, the combination of a
direct supply policy and a template view of housing leads governments
to produce high quality housing for very few households.
Could governments increase housing expenditures on housing enough
to provide high standard housing for all? This seems unlikely for
three reasons. The first reason is that total government expendi-
ture itself increases only slowly, according to "Wagner's Law" slightly
faster than income (Musgrave, 1976, p. 132). In fact, across countries
the share of total public expenditure only increases 6% per U.S. $1,000
increase in GDP per capita (ibidem, p. 138-39). The second reason is
Table: 3.5 Comparison of the total cost of housing construction (all new dwellings satisfying the quality standards required by the template
view of housing) and the resources available in the country.
Tota cot o h uingcontrucion urner of dwellings
Yearly housing requirement Construc- Total cost tal c f housing construction u be be built
tion cost of housing as a percentage of using the total govt
Increase in per dwell- construct- Total con- Total govt exp on housing and
GDP per households Replacement ing (19) tion (11) GDP struction Expendi- community facilities
Name Year capita (3) (4) Total (5) US $ 101 US $ (12) output (13) ture (14) (16)
INDONESIA 1973 130 (1) 492,000 558,000 1,044,000 2,500 (6) 2,610 16 400 59 35,400 (17)
COLOMBIA 1970 335 (1) 111,000 82,000 193,000 4,300 (7) 830 12 240 98 1,590
EGYPT 1978 400 (2) 173,000 151,000 324,000 7,000 (8) 2,270 15 375 35 24,570
ALGERIA 1977 1,130 (1) 106,000 68,000 174,000 55,000 (10) 9,570 49 367 156 (15) 6,410 (18)
PANAMA 1977 1,270 (1) 11,000 7,200 18,200 10,000 (9) 237 11 220 36 1,160
Notes:
1. Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 1980, Economic Data Sheet I.
2. Source: World Bank, 1975, p. 12.
3. The increase in households was calculated as follows: the increase in population from data found in IBRD,.1980, Economic Data
Sheet I, is divided by the household size found in IBRD, 1975, p. 49-59.
4. The replacement requirements are calculated as follows: we assumed that all households have a dwelling, and that the demolition rate was 2'; per annum.
We then took the population figure found in IBRD, 1980, Economic Data Sheet I, divided it by the household size found in IBRD, 1975, p. 49-59, and
multiplied it by 0.02.
5. Sum of the two previous columns.
6. From notes collected during the author's work for M&R International, Brussels, in Indonesia in 1974.
7. Source: IBRD, 1975, Appendix Table 13.
8. From notes collected during the author's work for the MIT/Cairo University Technological Planning Program in Egypt in 1979.
9. Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1977, p. A17.
10. Source: Ammara, 1980.
11. Total cost is equal to total housing requirement times the construction cost per dwelling unit.
12. Source for GDP: IBRD, 1980, Economic Data Sheet I. For Egypt we have calculated the GOP for 1978 from the figure of 1977 using a 4-year average of
the previous growth rates of GDP.
13. Source for the output of the construction sector: ibidem. For Egypt we used the same method of calculating the 1978 figure as we did for GOP.
14. Source for total government expenditure (except for Algeria): ibidem. For Egypt we used the same method of calculating the 1978 figure as for GOP.
15. Source for total government expenditure: Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire, 1979 b, p. 326.
16. The figure shown was obtained by dividing the total sum spent by governments on housing and community facilities by the construction cost per dwelling
unit. The source for the government expenditure on housing and community facilities is IBRD, 1980, Economic Data Sheet 2 (except for Indonesia and
Algeria).
17. Since the source mentioned in (16) does not contain an actual figure we assumed that 2% of total government expenditures would be devoted to housing and
community facilities. This is a higher percentage than the average calculated for a few countries with similar GDP per capita.
18. Source: Republique AlgerienneDemocratique et Populaire, 1979 b, p. 333.
19. The figures are construction costs for public housing units.
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that given the level of total expenditure the possibility of switching
expenditure to housing is limited since the allocation of the budget
among sectors and ministries is quite rigid, particularly in the short
term. Budget cuts would be resisted by the rest of the government both
because a large share of expenditures are recurrent expenses which
cannot be reduced and because most ministries consider a budget cut as
a political defeat.
Finally, in every government there is a strong faction, often lead
by the ministries of national planning, industry or national economy,
which will resist such an increase. This faction holds an economic
planner's view of housing investment. Housing ranks very low in their
investment priorities for three reasons. First because it has a very
high capital output ratio, the housing sector requires a large amount
of investment to generate a relatively low flow of housing services.
Second, housing investment only yields consumption goods. The type of
investments which economic planners often prefer is that which produces
capital goods, because these permit further investment and further
economic growth. Some housing enthusiasts claim that housing helps
economic growth because good housing increases the productivity of
workers. But many economic planners consider that there is no reliable
evidence that it does.
The disfavor of housing investment in the eyes of economic
planners stems partly from the type of models they use implicitly or
explicitly. One of the more popular models, the Fel'dman model of
growth, clearly shows that the growth of investment and thus of
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economic output will be larger the smaller the capital output ratio and
the larger the portion of investment devoted to producing capital
goods (Jones, 1976, p. 114-19).
The last reason why economic planners disfavor housing investment
is that it competes for many non-traded goods which are an essential
ingredient of all investments. Housing is almost one hundred percent
construction, most other investments require around fifty percent con-
struction. Many resources used in construction are non-traded or not
easily imported. All the heavy materials used in construction such as
bricks, blocks, sand and gravel, are non-traded. The entrepreneurial
skills of contractors and much skilled labor is hard to import. Some
commodities needed in construction such as cement, steel and lumber
are normally tradable. But very often, especially in the developing
world, a shortage of a non-traded service: harbor capacity, makes the
import of these materials nearly impossible.
For all the reasons given above it seems that no government could
ever hope to increase expenditures on housing enough to provide dwell-
ings which conform to the template for all. If that is so, why do so
many governments persist in providing a lot of housing for a few? Why
do governments refuse to relinquish their template view of housing and
help provide many households with a little improvement instead? We
can only make some guesses as to the cause. Officials in charge of
housing may suffer from professionalism and acculturation. Very often
they have been educated in richer countries and feel compelled to
apply what they have been taught almost literally. It is as if adapt-
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ing their skills to local circumstances would make them lose the
status that they acquired through studying aborad. This phenomenon is
not restricted to government officials; many technicians in the modern
private construction sector, who actually build public housing, have the
same attitudes.
A second reason could be that government officials and the elite
to which they belong may feel that their intention of giving the poor
high quality housing makes their privileges more defensible. It is
also possible that governments prefer distributing high cost dwelling
to any equitable policy because it offers the opportunity for patronage
that can enhance the political power of administrators. "A lot for a
few" policies may generate a flow of bribes that makes corrupt officials
unwilling to dismantle the policies once in place. The large modern
firms who are best able to deliver high standard public housing are
also the ones that are best organized to lobby. They have enough
monopoly power to generate excess profits from which large bribes can
be distributed.
Whatever the reasons, governments continue to provie high standard
housing for very few. Even when they have been convinced to trade the
classicial 5-story walk-up type public housing programs for new ones
such as core house and site and services projects, most governments
continue to set standards so high that only a fraction of those in need
can be helped.
In this chapter, in a wide ranging discussion of the housing
problem, we have madea number of points. Now let us briefly summarize
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them. Our first task was to reconcile two views of the housing situa-
tion: the administrative view, which argues there is a serious short-
age, and the ethnographic view which contends that very few households
are without a home, hence shortages are not a pressing problem.
Since the two views are based on data sources so different in
nature as to be incomparable, we had to have recourse to another in-
dependent data set, the census, to check the validity of the official
production data on which the government view is based. The two data
sources presented such a different picture of the housing situation
that we had to examine both of them closely to discuss which of the
two might have less bias. We decided that the census was likely to
undercount the number of dwellings far less than would official produc-
tion statistics. Furthermore, there was no reason to expect over-
counting of the housing stock in census taking so we concluded that the
census was the more accurate set of data. When we compare housing
stocks with the number of households using census data, indeed we found
that for almost all countries, the two numbers matched fairly closely
so there was no evidence of an aggregate shortage, defined as fewer
dwellings than households.
Analyzing the method of collection of official production data
revealed that, what we call the template view of housing, combined with
a low level of penetration of government in society, was instrumental
in causing the government to overestimate the magnitude of the housing
shortage. We then showed that the logic of the template view of housing
also shapes government response to the perceived housing crisis in a
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way that makes it particularly unsuited to alleviating what we con-
sider the most important aspect of the housing problem, the low quality
of the housing which so large a portion of the population can afford.
We arrived at that conclusion by noting that, should the govern-
ment choose to intervene by providing housing directly, as appears to
be easiest for them to do in countries where government penetration is
low, the template view dictates that public housing should be of a very
high quality. We calculated the resource requirements of providing
this quality of housing in quantities sufficient to eradicate the
shortage of dwellings meeting the standards, and found them to far
exceed the resources available to government. When the policy is
tailored to meet the available resources it may be reduced to having a
negligible effect, because as we saw in Chapter I, when very few
households receive a better home than they can afford, they simply
trade some of the quality away, be selling or subletting parts of it.
Those receiving a home are better off in terms of income though their
dewelling may only be marginally better. Those that do not receive
a home are not helped at all, they may even be hurt if government bids
up the price of housing, and middle income families, who can well
afford it, end up living in decent homes. To end the chapter we
suggested some reasons why what appears to be such an undesirable
policy persists anyway.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III
(1) An example of such a permit is the "habite-se" in Brazil.
(2) The United States, where the Bureau of the Census is responsible
to the Department of Commerce is somewhat of an exception.
(3) We are grateful to Professor Lisa Peattie for having pointed this
out.
(4) The word dwelling is used here as the equivalent of "housing
unit" in the United Nations nomenclature.
(5) As we have shown earlier under reasonable assumptions regarding
the rate of losses and the growth rate of households and if housing
production were accurately measured, the Ratio should be around 1.6.
(6) It is of course possible that the construction output and GDP
are undermeasured, but almost certainly not enough to invalidate our
analysis.
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IV. THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING
In the next three chapters we will elaborate and estimate a
structural model of the market for new housing. In this chapter we
develop the specification of the demand side. In the following chapter,
we will develop the supply side. In Chapter VI we will estimate the
parameters and do some hypothesis testing using those estimates.
We want to develop a model of demand for housing investment ap-
propriate for answering the questions formulated at the end of Chapter
I. The principal refinements upon previous empirical work which we
will make are as follows, Since in Chapter III we showed that official
housing investment data are systematically biased, we will use an al-
ternative measurement of investment with less bias. Previous cross
country studies have not used price in estimating equations for hous-
ing investment. We will specify the demand for housing as a function
of price, among other variables. Earlier we remarked that the existing
literature on the long run determinants of housing investment rarely
examined the effect of government policy variables. We will specify
a model which will permit us to do so. In order to test the effects
of one policy variable, mortgage finance availability, we have assembl-
ed, from primary sources, a cross country data series on outstanding
mortgage debt in housing capital. In addition, we will try to take
account of climate, a variable long considered important, but as yet
untested. All previous empirical work on housing investment has used
total real housing investment as the dependent variable. We have
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chosen instead to divide housing investment into two components,
demand for dwelling units and demand for size and quality attributes
of each unit. Since these two dimensions of investment might well
be determined by different variables, and since changes in them have
different policy implications, we should be able to improve our under-
standing of the investment process considerably by studying the two
components separately.
A. Demand for New Units
1. Demographic Variables
Turning first to the specification of the equation for the number
of new units produced, the data presented in Table 3.2 indicate that in
most countries the number of dwellings matches quite closely the number
of households. From this we conclude that in the long run the growth
rate in the housing stock (STOGRO) must be determined mainly by demo-
graphic variables. Two variables should explain the growth in the
housing stock. The first is the population growth twenty years earlier
(POPGRO-20) (1). This variable was chosen because it measures the
component of the increase in households brought about by a new cohort
of the population coming to the age of marriage or cohabitation. We
expect the coefficient of this population variable to be positive. The
number of households will also increase when the average household
size is reduced. We expect thus that the rate of change in the house-
hold size (HHSGRO) will have a negative effect on the growth rate of
the housing stock.
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It might be argued that household size is only a function of the
amount of housing available, thus household size will always simply
adjust to housing shortages. To a certain extent this may be the case,
and we cannot really control for the effect of housing shortages on
household size nor guess its magnitude. But a number of other factors
influence household size as well. The household size can decrease when
divorce becomes more acceptable or when as countries develop, more
job mobility is required, and extended families are forced to break up
as workers move to find jobs. Rodwin argues that a mere increase in
income will cause a decrease in household size (1955, p. 70-71). In-
creases in transportation costs or in labor force participation may
cause even nuclear families to separate. In countries with mostly
nuclear families the aging of the population will also cause the average
household size to decrease. It is possible that housing shortages
have a relatively minor effect on household size compared to the
above mentioned factors.
2. Income and Other Variables
Although our view is that the growth rate in the housing stock is
determined solely by demographic variables, we have included some other
variables that might effect housing stock growth. We have included
the Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPCAP) because one might expect
that, the richer the country the more rapid the increase in the hous-
ing stock. One would thus expect a positive coefficient of GDPCAP.
Some, especially government officials, argue that public housing pro-
grams increase the growth rate of the housing stock. To test the
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validity of this hypothesis we have included the ratio of the number
of public housing units produced to the increase in the housing stock
(PUBRAT) as a measure of public sector involvement. We would expect
PUBRAT to have a positive coefficient if indeed governments build units
that would otherwise not have been built. Availability and cost of
housing finance both affect the demand for housing investment because
they transform the total resource cost of a home into a stream of
payments over time, thereby influencing total outlay and the level of
installment payments for a given resource cost. Our view is that
finance has little if any influence on the number of new units. It
is only important as a determinant of the demand for size and quality
attributes. This is because formal housing finance is merely one of
a number of alternative means of overcoming the wealth constraints
most families meet when investing in housing. Lack of formal financ-
ing is unlikely to keep many households from actually building or buy-
ing a home. However recourse to other forms of financing almost al-
ways raises the total stream of payments and the installment payment
due on the home. To tailor their monthly housing outlays to their
income, households will thus have to reduce the original resource cost
of the home, so they will reduce its quality and size. Nonetheless
we will allow for the possibility that formal housing financing has
a positive effect on the number of new units and include it in the
equation explaining the demand for new units. The best measure of such
finance availability is the ratio of the increase in mortgage debt to
the value of the increase in the housing stock (MDEBRAT). We prefer
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to use the ratio of the total outstanding mortgage debt to the total
replacement value of the housing stock (DEBRAT) because it is available
for more countries and because it is highly correlated with MDEBRAT
(p = 0.87).
To sum up, we have included the last three variables, GDCAP, PUBRAT
and DEBRAT, because there is a theoretical possibility that they have
an effect. In our view, the demand for new units is primarily de-
termined by demographic variables and is insensitive to the economic
variables. Thus we expect only the coefficients of the rate of change
in the household size and the rate of population growth to be statis-
tically significant. Specifically we expect both these variables to
have coefficients opposite in sign and near 1 in absolute value.
3. Data
To measure the dependent variable in our equation for the demand
for units we have chosen to use the growth rate of the housing stock
as measured in the census, rather than official production normalized
by the existing housing stock. We believe the stock data to be more
reliable because they are collected from census results, however, they
are also a biased measure of housing production because they omit con-
struction to replace losses. For official production data the under-
counting is worse in poor countries; for census data the undermeasure-
ment from omission of replacement construction is worse in countries
with low population growth, usually rich countries.
We prefer a measurement of housing production based on stock data
for the following reasons. Not only is the magnitude of the bias less,
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it also varies less systematically with income. We have shown that
the undermeasurement of official housing production varies systema-
tically with both income per capita and the population growth rate (see
Tables 3.3 and 3.4). It is unlikely that losses to the housing stock
which are composed of planned demolition, destruction by fire, flood,
windstorm and earthquake as well as conversions to other uses, vary,
systematically, with income or demographic variables. This hypothesis
cannot be tested, however', due to lack of data. For many countries,
housing loss data are either not available, incomplete or unreliable.
They are unreliable because they suffer from a strong undermeasurement
bias, similar to that of official production statistics except that
template view of housing does not play a role. Often the statistics
are merely demolition statistics, collected by counting demolition
permits. Not only does this ignore accidental demolitions and con-
versions, but in poor countries, government's lack of penetration in
society implies severe undermeasurement even of planned demolitions.
B. Demand for Space
The second component of total demand for housing investment is
demand for size and quality characteristics of new dwellings. Ideally,
demand for all characteristics of homes could be specified separately,
as a function of relative prices, incomes, and any parameters affecting
tastes across countries. However the data necessary to estimate these
separate demand equations are simply not available. We must be
satisfied with explaining only the demand for the surface area of new
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dwellings, the only housing characteristic for which we have data,
controlled to the extent that is possible for the effects of other
quality attributes. To control for the effects of quality attributes
on the demand for space, two types of correction are necessary. First,
cost per meter squared should be purged of the variations resulting
from different levels of housing quality across countries. Second,
theoretically the prices of all other attributes affect the demand for
space and thus should be included in the equation.
To make the first correction, if the data were available, a hedonic
price equation could be estimated for each country. (2) The con-
struction cost per square meter of housing could then be expressed in
terms of a variety of quality attributes and this equation could be
used to recalculate costs for each country holding quality constant. (3)
The coefficients on all the different housing attributes in the
hedonic price equation give estimates of the prices of quality at-
tributes and these could also be included in the equation for the
demand for space. But the data requirements for the hedonic price
equations far exceed availability. They require almost as much data
on characteristics of housing as would the system of demand equations
we spoke of earlier. So this type of correction is clearly not
feasible. A partial correction is to add variables which proxy quality
levels. A climatic variable was included partly for this reason. Un-
fortunately, there are no obvious proxies for the costs of housing
attributes other than space.
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1. Income Variable
Turning now to the determinants of the size of new dwellings
(MSQDW), we hypothesize that space per dwelling is positively related
to some measure of income. The positive effect of income on demand
is a standard result in the theory of constrained utility maximization
underlying our analysis. Previous cross country studies of housing
investment have always used Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPCAP).
However we think that Gr6ss Domestic Product per household (GDPHH)
should be used to explain demand for dwelling space instead. Decisions
to invest in or rent a home are based on household not per capita in-
come. If household income is the conceptually correct measure to use,
income elasticities will be estimated inaccurately if income per capita
is used instead. In Table 4.1 we estimate a negative relation between
household size and per capita income. (Detailed description of the
data used for each variable can be found in Appendix A.) The re-
sults of this regression indicate that the income elasticity estimated
with per capita income will be lower than the more relevant household
income elasticity.
2. Price
A second variable influencing the demand for housing space is its
price. Presumably when the price of space goes up people will sub-
stitute away from housing by choosing a smaller home. Thus the ex-
pected sign of the coefficient on price is negative. For items whose
selling price is very high relative to income, such as housing, the
cost of acquisition of the good is not determined uniquely by this
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Table: 4.1 Regression Results: Household size (HHS) (pooled cross-
sectional - time series sample) on GDP per capita (GDPCAP).
Key: (t - statistics are between brackets, below the coefficients)
a: significant at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test.
b: 0.05 " "1 
"1
















selling price. As we mentioned earlier in discussing the inclusion of
DEBRAT in the demand for units, the terms of the financing, which is
almost always necessary for the purchase of a home, determine both the
total real outlay and the installment payment on a home. Both pre-
sumably influence demand for space. We will treat the effects in de-
tail when we discuss mortgage finance variables. Now we concentrate
on the resource cost of space.
Though the resource cost of dwellings is theoretically an ex-
tremely important variable, measuring it correctly poses some problems.
Researchers have chosen to solve these in a number of different ways.
(Please refer to the discussion in Chapter II.) We decided to use
nominal average construction cost per meter squared in U.S. dollars to
measure the price of housing (COSTMSQ). As mentioned in our review of
the literature in Chapter II, few other analyses of housing investment
have used a direct measure of housing costs, though a direct measure
is admittedly best. Our data on average cost per meter squared is
comparable to Federal Housing Administration data used in some
American cross sectional studies.
Though our measure of construction costs is the best available,
it has some shortcomings, as does our measure for the dependent
variable, meters squared per dwelling. Both series were obtained
from official production data. Especially in the poorer countries,
where only part of the total dwelling production is measured, what is
measured is not representative of characteristics of all additions
to the housing stock. Because housing production is measured mostly
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through building permit statistics, and because the requirements for
permits exceed the standards of much of the actual building being
done, both size and the cost per meter squared will be higher than an
average of the total real production. This reduces the variation in
the quality of housing on which the cost per meter squared is based
and thus corrects the cost measurement to some extent for quality
variations. Unfortunately the measurement bias also reduces the varia-
tion in meters squared per dwelling. This sheds some doubt on the
coefficients estimated using these series. But no other data is
available, so these are the best estimates possible at this time.
In our introduction to this section we mentioned that cost
should be controlled for quality, and that costs of other attributes
should be included in the equation for dwelling space. Consumer de-
mand theory also suggests that prices of other consumption goods should
be included in the equation for demand for space. The problem is to
find a good or a service which is a substitute for housing investment
or housing services and which is demanded in comparable amounts across
countries. At first one might think the price of a food item could
be used. Unfortunately no food item is consumed across countries in
anywhere near the same proportion of income. The proportion of total
food expenditure in total consumption can vary from a figure of 50 per-
cent in the Philippines to 14 percent in the United States. For a
single food item such as bread and cereals the percentages differ even
more: 23 percent in the Philippines versus two percent in the United
States (Kravis, 1978, p. 89). Another possibility for normalizing
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the price of housing is to divide it by a basket of commodities Multiplied
by the internationally comparable prices developed by Kravis et al.
(ibidem). Unfortunately there is not enough overlap between the 16
countries studied by Kravis et al. and the 28 countries included in
this study. Since no satisfactory denominator could be found to cal-
culate a relative price we have to be satisfied with nominal prices
in U.S. dollars instead.
3. Climate
Climatic conditions are a third determinant of the demand for
space. Households incur both recurrent and one time expenses to pro-
tect themselves from a rigorous climate. The one time expenses are
part of the quality dimension of the home, thus to the extent that
climate induces quality adjustment, the rigors of climate will be a
proxy for quality and their inclusion in the demand equation will par-
tially mitigate the problems caused by using a cost measure uncorrected
for quality. Furthermore, the one time quality adjustment to climatic
severity is a competing attribute to housing size. The more such
quality adjustment is required by climate, ceteris paribus, the less
families will want to spend on space.
However recurrent costs are an important dimension of the cost
of having a home of a certain size, and are thus another means by which
climatic factors influence the demand for space. A number of factors
affect recurrent costs but we hope to capture most of the variation
across countries with a variable measuring climatic severity. The
recurrent expenses of keeping a home within temperature and humidity
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comfort zones are great because the comfort zone is narrow: without
ventilation between 21 and 27 degrees Celcius and between 20 and 50
percent humidity (Bussat, 1972, p. 3). The expenses related to heating
or cooling, humidifying or dehumidifying, and ventilating are directly
related to the volume of the dwelling. Once volume is reduced by lower-
ing the height of rooms to the minimum livable level, volume can only
be reduced further by decreasing the surface area. For this reason,
climatic extremes are likely to have a negative effect on the demand for
space.
The effect of climate on lifestyle will also influence the demand
for space. All other determinants of demand held equal, given a more
rigorous climate, we hypothesize that people will desire more space
since they must spend more time inside their homes. This positive
effect on the demand for space will offset to some extent the negative
effect on housing demands of climate via recurrent costs. Hence we
have no presumption as to the sign of the coefficient, though our hunch
is that the negative effect of costs will predominate.
We must now find a measure of the severity of climate. We have
assumed here that cold is the climatic condition that is the most ex-
pensive to protect against. Very high temperatures may have a similar
e~ffect but only a very small share of the populations of two countries
included in our sample, the United States and Egypt, live in regions
where temperature maxima would be more extreme than the minima and
would thus affect the demand for dwelling space. Rain fall was not
included as a measure of climate because it does not necessitate large
- 112 -
recurrent expenses. The measure of cold we decided to use is an
average (over the main cities of each country) of extreme temperatures
(COLD). (Details of the assembly of the data are found in Appendix
A.) One could also use another measure of cold such as the average
temperature during the three coldest months. But it was thought that
since extremes occur regularly, several times during housing asset
life, and peoples' lives, households choose dwellings suited to the
worst conditions (4) so extreme temperatures are a better measurement
than averages.
4. Demographic Effects
While harsh climate may reduce the size of a dwelling we expect
that a large household size will increase it. This effect may be small
since there may be considerable economies of scale in dwellings. Many
spaces of a dwelling such as a kitchen, bathroom, toilet, stairway,
living room and halls remain constant in size over a large range of
family sizes, at least as large as the sizes covered in our sample.
We expect thus a small positive effect of the household size (HHS)
on MSQDW.
5. Policy Variables
We now turn to the effects of direct policy variables. Cost of
course can be influenced by policy and so is an indirect policy vari-
able. For example, the elasticity of demand with respect to cost
gives some information about the effects of cost reducing policies.
But here we want to examine the effects of direct government inter-
vention, such as the provision of public housing.
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a. Provision of Public Housing
In poorer countries the template requirement discussed in Chapter
III induces the authorities to provide public housing that is both
larger and better than average. It seems obvious that, all other things
constant, when the government makes up a larger segment of the demand
for housing, then the demand for space will increase. However, the
crucial point is that provision of public housing does not necessarily
represent final demand in the housing market. Government can only
commission the production of housing, then rent or sell the homes to
final users. If government succeeds in forcing the recipients of
public housing benefits to live in the houses as built, then they do
influence final demand. But if the recipients of public housing can
trade away all or some of the housing services given them by the
government either by subdivision or subletting, then the government
preferences for size and quality are irrelevant to final demand be-
cause they are only an intermediary in the provision of housing. In-
dividual households will be the only final demanders of housing and the
basic economic parameters influencing the structure of demand in the
population will be unchanged by public housing provision, except for
the implicit income transfer that the policy provides to housing
recipients. (Please refer to Chapter III for details of this dis-
cussion.) The coefficient on the variable we use for public housing
provision (PUBRAT, the ratio of new public dwellings to the total in-
crease in the housing stock) should thus be either positive or zero.
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b. Finance
Public housing investment is probably the most direct way govern-
ments can try to affect the amount of housing investment. Government
also has a number of monetary and fiscal tools at its disposal with
which to influence the housing sector. It can also choose to intervene
more directly by creating and regulating institutions that specialize
in housing finance. But the question is: how important is finance to
housing investment? One is overwhelmed by the enthusiasm and con-
fidence of the response to this question in the literature. "The
absence of a mortgage system can lead to stagnation of the building and
materials industries, increased unemployment, social discontent, and
in some instances even political upheaval." (Abrams, 64, p. 143). "The
lack of mortgage funds frequently constrains housing" (World Bank, 75,
p. 30); "...as in the production of other assets with relatively long
useful lives, house construction is aided by the availability of long
term credit." (Grimes, 76, p. 56); "A well-developed housing finance
system is one which significantly facilitates the purchase, rental,
construction and improvement of homes for the population as a whole"
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1976, p.
71). Many more testimonials of the same nature could be quoted. But
in all these quotations it is not clearly stated whether housing
finance increases the number of the size of dwellings or both.
Housing is an expensive asset that very few individuals can ac-
quire out of their own wealth and even fewer out of their income. But
it is an oversimplification to assume that people desiring to buy a
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dwelling can turn only to mortgage finance to complement their own
resources. Depending on the country, people borrow from their family,
from their employer, from mutual saving associations, from small
money lenders, from the builder or developer of the dwellings, or
people even increase their debt with suppliers of consumption goods.
Most of the sources of funds just mentioned are less advantageous
in their terms to borrowers than the formal mortgage financing in-
stitutions. The non-formal sources are usually thought to impose
shorter amortization periods and charge higher explicit or implicit
interest rates. Lower interest rates and amortization periods of
formal financing make repayments smaller so that a given household can
afford to contract a large debt and hence a more expensive home. The
increase in the share of total lending by the formal mortgage in-
stitutions should increase demand for housing by reducing the average
cost of borrowing and the average installment.
The lowering of the installment payments has the additional effect
of relaxing the liquidity constraint for low income households. Even
if the total price of the house in terms of the net present value of
the payment stream rises, when the installment payment can be brought
low enough, liquidity constrained families will procure more housing.
One would thus expect that across countries the reduction of the
average cost of borrowing for housing investment brought about by the
increase in the relative loan volume from formal housing credit in-
stitutions would increase the quality of housing demanded by each
household. Hence there should be a positive effect on the number of
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meters squared per dwelling.
We will use the marginal debt ratio (MDEBRAT), the change in the
value of loans outstanding divided by the value of the increase in the
housing stock, to measure mortgage availability. This will be an ap-
propriate measure if repayments of principal are small relative to
gross new lending and if this relationship does not vary systematically
across countries. The marginal debt ratio is the appropriate indicator
because it measures mortgage availability in the country at the time
when the decision to invest is made, but it could only be calculated
for an insufficient number of countries. So to gain observations we
will estimate the relation using the average debt to replacement
value ratio (DEBRAT). This figure is more readily available and is
highly correlated to MDEBRAT (p = 0.87).
Thus far we have two alternatives for measuring the availability
of mortgage credit. Ideally we would have liked to include one or
more variables which would measure the cost, averaged over both formal
and informal finance sources of mortgage finance. These variables
would have been weighted averages of interest rates, amortization
periods and front-end costs. Unfortunately there are not enough data
comparable across countries on the amortization period and front end
costs to take account of these factors. Also, we were only able to
devise a very ad hoc measure of average interest rates. Including
only interest rates, without controlling for other important dimensions
of mortgage packages available across other countries, can only give
a very imperfect estimate of the effects. It also gives a very im-
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perfect estimate of the effects of looser or tighter housing finance
on demand. But since so many studies have focused on the effects of
interest rates, we have included them in the specification of our
demand equation.
Although the interest rates charged on formal mortgage loans are
available the interest rates charged in the informal sector are not.
To get an estimate.of these we had to make the heroic assumption that
this informal interest rate is close to, or at least correlated to the
shadow price of capital and that this is equal to the long run nominal
growth rate of the economy. The average interest rate (AVINT) is ob-
tained by weighting the formal mortgage interest rate by the share of
mortgage debt in the value of the housing stock (DEBRAT) and the
nominal growth rate by the remaining share (1-DEBRAT). If the average
interest rate has any influence at all on the demand for housing
space, this influence should be negative. As an alternative interest
rate, we also tried using the official mortgage interest rate (MORINT).
We also expect the coefficient of MORINT to be negative.
The interest rates we have chosen to use are all nominal rather
than real interest rates, because we feel that the nominal interest
rate is the relevant variable in this demand equation. In a world
without liquidity constraints, the real discounted value of the stream
of loan payments would be all that is relevant to the household,
and this is determined by the real interest rate. However, if some
families are liquidity constrained, the level of the first installment
payment also matters in their decision to consume housing. Even if
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it is only inflation that causes the nominal rate of interest to be
high, a high interest rate may raise the installment payment so high
that liquidity constrained families simply cannot afford the payments
in the early period of the loan, regardless of how low the real value
of the discounted stream of payments may be. We assume that liquidity
constraints are important for most households, hence we prefer the
nominal interest raite.
C. Summary
To summarize our demand side specification, we will estimate two
demand equations, one for the number of units and one for the surface
per unit.
STOGRO = f (POPGRO-20, HHSGRO, GDPCAP, PUBRAT, DEBRAT) (1)
and






We have also specified this equation using some alternatives for DEBRAT:

















= the average of mortgage interest rates and a measure
of the interest rates on housing finance from other
sources.
= a measure of cold.
= the cost per meter squared of residential construc-
tion in U.S. dollars.
= the outstanding mortgage debt.
= the ratio of the outstanding mortgage loans to the
value of the housing stock.
the change in the outstanding mortgage debt.
= the production of public housing between census years.
= the increase in the housing stock between census years.
= GDP per capita
=
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HHSGRO = the growth rate in the household size.
MDEBRAT = the ratio of the net increase in outstanding mortgaged
loans to the value of the increase of the housing
stock.
MORINT = the nominal interest rate on mortgage loans.
MSQDW the average meter squared per dwelling.
NOMGRO = the nominal growth rate of GDP.
POPGRO-20= the population growth rate twenty years before base
year.
PUBRAT = the ratio of the number of public housing to increase
in the housing stock.
STOGRO = the growth rate in the housing stock.
STOK = the number of dwellings in the housing stock.
We argue thus that demographic variables, population and house-
hold size, will be the primary determinants of the number of units. We
expect on the other hand that the surface area will be sensitive to a
number of other variables affecting cost, preferences and effective
purchasing power.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
(1) The figure is somewhat arbitrary. It was chosen because it was
thought to be the average between the age of male and female when they
marry or start cohabitating. However the estimated coefficients proved
robust to variation in the lag. This is because population growth rates
vary only very slowly.
(2) For two good expositions of hedonic theory please refer to Rosen
(1974) or Wheaton (1977).
(3) For a good example of this method, please refer to Ferguson and
Wheaton (1980).
(4) In civil and architectural engineering structures and facilities
are routinely designed to withstand extreme conditions that occur on
average only every fifty or hundred years. For example, rainwater
drainage pipes are designed to drain cloudbursts of an intensity that
only occurs every 50 years. Chimneys are designed to withstand wind-
bursts at speeds that only occur every 50 years. House heating systems
are designed to cope with temperatures lower than any recorded ex-
treme. The summer heat wave of 1980 in the Southern United States may
very well increase insulation air cooling standards in that region for
the next 50 years.
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V. THE SUPPLY SIDE
A. Cost Function Approach
To model long run supply, if competitive markets predominate, then
a cost function is appropriate. If one assumes constant returns to
scale, the cost function can be specified to depend only on factor
prices. This assumption may not be too unrealistic for industries with
many small producers. The construction sector, particularly residential
construction, may meet these requirements to a certain extent. Thus
we could express the construction cost per square meter of dwelling as
a function of the cost of factors used in residential construction:
labor, capital and materials.
However, assembling reliable cross country data on factor prices
posed some serious problems. First of all for most of the countries
in our sample separate wage data for residential construction is not
published, wages are given for the construction sector as a whole. For
six countries, even construction sector wages were not available. We
had to use manufacturing wages instead for five of these countries
and agricultural wages for one. For two of the countries for
which construction sector wages were available, only wage guide-
lines set by the government rather than wages actually paid were
published.
The rent on capital used in the construction sector is not
measured. A-second best measure would be some average cost of capital
in the economy as a whole. Harberger (1977) has done the only study
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we know of on the rates of return to capital across countries. But
the results of this study do not seem to help much because Harberger
concludes from the analysis of his data that "there is an international
capital market which tends to equalize rates of return to capital
across countries in much the same manner as national capital markets
tend to equalize rates of return across activities and regions."
(ibidem, p. 19. 21). This precludes using the variation in the rate
of return to capital to help explain variations in construction costs
(1). Of course, if Harberger is right, the cost of capital need not
be included in the cost equation, because it does not vary.
However, we preferred to be a little skeptical of Harberger's
results and tried to find another measure for the return on capital.
Since it was impossible to find estimates of user cost, we used the
nominal growth rate of GDP as a proxy, under the assumption that the
latter moves with the long run cost of capital.
Assembling data on the cost of materials proved impossible given
the scope of this thesis. The cost of a few materials such as cement
and reinforcement rods are published for only a handful of countries.
Since the cost of materials can be theoretically broken into wages
and rent on capital, one could exclude the price of raw materials from
a construction cost function under certain assumptions. These assump-
tions are those necessary to make the cost structure in the materials
sector, both domestic and foreign, the same as that of the construc-
tion sector. Unfortunately this is a very strong set of assumptions
that we cannot expect will often be met.
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Nonetheless, we used the data available and estimated a cost
function. Given the unreliability and crudity of the data, it is not
surprising that the regression results were quite disappointing. Both
the coefficients of construction wages and nominal growth were insigni-
ficant and the R2 was low. The results of the regression are in
Appendix E.
B. Generalized Supply Function
The cost function approach to modeling the supply side has not
only failed because of a lack of data but even had it succeeded it
might not have shed light on some important questions about the deter-
minants of costs in construction. In Chapter I we discussed the possi-
ble importance of long run bottlenecks in construction, and the amount
of public housing in determining the price of housing. For a number
of reasons the cost function approach will not take account of these
factors. The conditions purportedly causing bottlenecks represent
significant departures from the competitive framework in which a cost
function is relevant, For example, a cost function assumes away the
shortages of critical housing materials and skilled labor that could
make government construction of public housing have an effect on the
supply of housing. Yet given the aims of this study, it would be
desirable to explore these phenomena and test hypotheses about them in
some way. So we will try to develop a specification of the housing
supply function that is general enough to take into account some of
these effects.
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First, let us discuss the reasoning behind the hypothesis of a
long run bottleneck. On the existence of a long run bottleneck in the
construction sector, opinions are divided. The neoclassical view is
that bottlenecks are almost by definition short run phenomena, and
that markets adjust in the long run. According to this view the long
run supply curve is flat. The opposite view is that the long run
supply curve slopes upward, because factor supplies in construction
never fully adjust. The poorer the country, it is argued, the more
inadequate will be the adjustment and thus the worse will be the
bottleneck.
The most important of the factor bottlenecks seems to be the
shortage of labor, In many countries there appears to be a long last-
ing shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labor. While the formal part
of trade education may not be longer than three to six months, training
on the job may last several years, under the best circumstances. In
many countries there is a shortage of qualified master tradesmen to
supervise and furhter train the graduates of trade schools. Often-
times, in poorer countries, the very qualified tradesmen either
emigrate or relinquish their trade. Good tradesmen often become con-
tractors or merchants.
Wages in the construction sector do not rise sufficiently to en-
courage new workers to invest in skills or even to keep already
qualified workers in the sector. It may also be that many workers are
reluctant to invest in skills that will only be useful in a highly
cyclical industry. Contractors may prefer to collect rents during
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booms rather raise wages enough to attract as much labor as the sector
could absorb.
In many countries there is a social stigma attached to being a
construction worker that is not sufficiently compensated by the wage.
In those same countries there is less shame in being a construction
worker abroad. This factor together with higher wages abroad can
create a drain on the qualified construction labor force. Even when
emigrants return, rather than continue to use their human capital in
construction they often use their accumulated savings to start
businesses in the trade or services sector.
A shortage of construction labor induces demand for construction
equipment. In many developing countries such capital may be in short
supply because the equipment has to be imported from the developed
countries, and imports are constrained by a lack of foreign exchange.
When those constraints do not bind, as in oil rich developing nations
such as Iraq, Iran, Nigeria or Saudi Arabia other constraints appear.
Harbors are often congested and much of the equipment is too heavy to
be flown in. In some countries rigorous climatic conditions, poor
maintenance and mishandling by insufficiently trained operators can be
a very large drain on construction capital.
For similar reasons many countries suffer from a shortage of
building materials. Domestic production cannot be increased rapidly
because gestation periods in that sector are long. For instance,
for a cement factoryor a large scale brick factory it may take five
years to reach full capacity production from the time the investment
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was planned. For integrated steel plants, it may take ten years.
Shortfalls of traded materials can be alleviated by imports. However
many governments restrict imports so as to perpetuate shortages. The
restrictions are adopted to protect domestic industry or in response
to the foreign exchange or savings constraint we mentioned earlier.
Even non-traded material such as sand, gravel, and stone can be in
short supply if produced or even transported with imported equipment.
Besides the bottlenecks in the supply of factors used in the
construction sector, many observers find evidence for a bottleneck
in the construction sector itself. Institutions for the dissemination
of information may be nonexistent or they may work inefficiently.
Managerial ability may be scarce so that most decisions are based on
custom rather than best practice. Because of these weaknesses in the
organization of the construction sector, supply may be very unre-
sponsive in the long run.
Let us now develop a specification for the long run supply
equation. In our generalized supply framework, factor costs will
still have an effect. Factor price data is so unsatisfactory that we
have chosen to use a proxy variable for wage costs. Gross Domestic
Product per household (GDPHH) should be strongly correlated with wage
levels across countries so we will include it in our supply equation.
We still have no good proxy for the costs of capital but this may not
be a serious problem. As we mentioned earlier, if Harberger's argu-
ment that returns to capital are equalized across countries is right,
then of course excluding capital costs will not cause problems. If
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the construction sector is not perfectly competitive, then there may
be no exogenously fixed price or capital feeding directly into construc-
tion prices, and hence, systematically influencing costs.
One implication of a construction bottleneck is that there is a
level of output which does not put pressure on the rigid capacity of
the sector. When economies try to exceed this level, output expands
slightly but prices rise dramatically. Thus we need some measure of
quantity pressure on prices. The share of construction in GDP (CONRAT)
(2) should provide a good indication of the amount by which construc-
tion exceeds or falls short of the "normal" level of construction out-
put. The CONRAT variable is intended to capture the effects of
quantity on the cost of production, but the supply equation must also
be specified to include some variables that determine the quality of
dwellings and thus influence the average cost per meter squared.
As we mentioned in Chapter IV in discussing housing demand,
dwellings are not homogeneous commodities but vary considerably in size
and quality attributes. Presumably, resource use is different for
different quality dwellings. Hence the prices of different quality
dewellings will vary to reflect this. Ideally then, one should dis-
aggregate the supply side of the housing market into the supply of
different characteristics of housing as a function of input prices.
Not surprisingly, the data necessary to estimate such a system are not
available. Here, we are only trying to estimate a function explaining
the variation of the supply price of a certain attribute, space, as
a function of some critical variables such as factor costs, and strains
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on supplies of fixed factor inputs. But we don't have ;a series on
the price of space alone. Our cost per meter squared data is just the
average cost of dwellings and will be subject to variation due to
changes in the average quality of dwellings. So as to correctly
identify the effects of the above mentioned variables on the cost per
equivalent square meter of housing, variables proxying the average
quality of dwellings should be added to the equation.
The first of these quality proxies will be the share of public
housing production in the total housing production (PUBRAT). If
public housing is of higher than average quality, then increasing its
share will raise the average quality and thus the average cost per
meter squared.
Climate will also have an effect on the cost per square meter,
through its positive effect on the average quality of dwellings.
Moreover, the construction process is also made more expensive by the
rigors of cold climates. Costly precautions must be taken to protect
workers and materials from the elements, otherwise both work time and
materials are wasted. Interruptions or slowdowns of construction work
during the winter increase the cost of carrying the unfinished build-
ing. GDPHH enters in our system of equations on the demand side by
increasing the demand for space and it enters in our supply function
as a proxy for wages, But income also increases the demand for
other quality attributes in housing, and we assume that the equilibrium
amounts of quality attributes in each country increase with income.
Hency income also serves as a quality proxy in our supply equation.
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To sum up, we have specified the supply equation as follows:
COSTMSQ = f (CONTRAT, GDPHH, COLD, PUBRAT) (3)
where
CONRAT NONRESCON + ((ASTOK/YEARS) x MSQDW x COSTMSQ)GDP
PUBRAT = APUBASTOK
For reference:
COLD = a measure of cold.
CONRAT = the ratio of the value of all construction to GDP.
COSTMSQ = the cost per meter squared of residential con-
struction in U.S. dollars.
APUB the production of public housing between census
years.
ASTOK = the increase in the housing stock between census
years.
MSQDW = the average meter squared per dwelling.
NONRESCON = the value of nonresidential construction.
YEARS = number of years between censuses.
The variables included in Equation (3) should cover the main
supply side determinants of cost variation across countries.
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NOTES ON CHAPTER V
(1) In addition Harberger's sample and our sample only overlapped by
eleven countries.
(2) We have replaced the official estimates of residential construc-
tion by the change in the housing stock times the dwelling unit cost.
(3) Construction wages increase faster across countries than the
average level. In poorer countries hourly wages in the construction
sector are lower than in the manufacturing sector. In richer countries
it is the opposite. Strassmann (1978, p. 4, 5) has proposed that the
shift in relative wages reflects an increase bargaining strength gained
by unionization instead of higher productivity.
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VI. ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL
A. The System of Equations
In the last two chapters we have discussed the specification of
the equations of our model. A summary of those equations follows.
On the demand side we have:




In(MSQDW) = b + b2ln(GDPHH) + b31n(COSTMSQ) +
b4ln(COLD) + b5ln(PUBRAT) + b6ln(HHS) + (2)
bjln(DEBRAT)
On the supply side we have




B. Choice of Estimation Technique
Now we turn to the estimation of the parameters in these equations.
The first step is to find a consistent estimation technique. We can-
not simply use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate because there
is a possibility that the error terms for one country in the three
equations of our system are correlated. If this is the case, when
endogenous variables enter as right hand side variables in another
equation, they are not orthogonal to the error term in that equation,
and OLS estimation is not consistent. However Two Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) yields consistent but inefficient estimates.
Fortunately there is a test which permits us to determine whether
OLS estimates are consistent or not. If we can determine that the OLS
estimates do not have endogeneity bias, then they provide consistent
and efficient estimates. The test we use is described fully in
Hausman (1978, p. 1251-71). The endogenous right hand side variables
in Equation 1 are PUBRAT and DEBRAT. In Equation (2) ln(COSTMSQ),
ln(PUBRAT) and ln(DEBRAT) (1) are endogenous and in Equation (3),
ln(PUBRAT)and ln(CONRAT) are endogenous. In this system the variables
are endogenous either because they are determined directly in another
equation of the system as in the case of ln(COSTMSQ), or they are
functions of a variable determined within the model as in the case
of ln(PUBRAT).
Table 6.1 shows the results of the tests of endogeneity (2).
Since the three test statistics are smaller than the critical value
of the X2 statistic at the 0.95 level of confidence we cannot reject
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Table: 6.1 Results of tests of endogeneity.
(1) The test we used is described in Hausman (1978, p. 1251-71).
(2) Refers to numbers given to equation on page 132.
Equation Variables Suspected Critical Value
Number (2) to be Endogenous Test Statistic of X2
1 PUBRAT 1.50 5.99
DEBRAT
2 in (COST.1SQ) 1.38 7.81
In (PUBRAT)
in (DEBRAT)
3 In (PUBRAT) 5.12 5.99
in (CONRAT)
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the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity bias.
C. Hypothesis Testing on OLS Estimates
1. Demand for Units
The results of the estimation of Equation (1),explaining the growth
rate in the housing stock are found in column 1 of Table 6.2 They
are as expected: the growth rate of the housing stock is a positive
function of the lagged population growth rate and a negative function
of the growth rate of household size. The t-statistics of the other
variables do not indicate statistical significance but to test properly
our original hypothesis that only demographic variables matter, we
will test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of the other
variables in the equation are zero. The results are shown in the first
row of Table 6.5 Since the test statistic is smaller than the critical
value of the X2 statistic at the 0.95 confidence level we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the coefficients a4 , a5, and a6 of the
variables GDPCAP, PUBRAT and DEBRAT are equal to zero.
We have no particular theoretical reason to keep these variables
in the equation. They were originally included for the sake of com-
pleteness. Now that we have shown they are not statistically
significant we can re-estimate the equation without them to get more
efficient estimates of the effects of demographic variables. The
results of this estimation are shown in column 2 of Table 6.2. The
coefficients have the expected signs and they are close to unity.
Those results confirm the findings of previous research on long run
- 136 -
Table: 6.2 Regression Results: Housing stock growth rate (STOGRO)
as a function of population growth rate (POPGRO), household size growth
rate (HHSGRO), the ratio between public housing production and increase
in stock (PUBRAT), or the ratio of the total outstanding mortgage debt
to the value of the housing stock (DEBRAT).
KEY: (t - statistics are between brackets, below the coefficients)
a: significant at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test.








housing starts. In the long run, growth in the housing stock keeps
pace with growth in the number of households.
2. Demand for Space
The results of estimation of Equation (2) explaining the demand
for dwelling space is found in Table 6.3 In the same table we have
also included the results of estimating Equation (2) replacing
ln(DEBRAT) by ln(AVINT) and ln(MORINT) (3). The result of the es-
timation of Equation (2) when ln(DEBRAT) is replaced by ln(MDEBRAT) is
presented in Appendix D.
In the first three columns of Table 6.3 we can compare the
estimation of Equation (2) using AVINT and MORINT as alternatives to
DEBRAT for measuring the effect of formal housing financing on the
demand for housing space. The fact that the coefficients of AVINT
and MORINT are insignificant confirms our guess that a more holistic
measure of the availability of formal mortgage finance (DEBRAT) is
better than either an incomplete measure of mortgage loan costs (MORINT)
or a very ad hoc measure of the cost of housing finance (AVINT).
In the results found in column 3 the coefficients of ln(PUBRAT)
and ln(HHS) are insignificant. Because we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficient of PUBRAT is zero, we must conclude
that as measured by the available data it is likely that the extent of
public housing production does not affect the demand for dwelling space.
Since we know that in many countries public dwellings are larger and
of higher quality than what recipient households could normally afford
the absence of an effect of PUBRAT on the demand for dwelling space
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Table: 6.3 Regression Results: Meter squared per dwelling (MSQDW) as a
function of income per household (GDPHH), cost per square meter (COSTMSQ),
cold (COLD), the ratio between public housing production and the growth in
the stock (PUBRAT), or the ratio of the total outstanding mortgage debt to
the value of the housing stock (DEBRAT) or the average of formal mortgageinterest and a measure of the interest rate on housing finance from other
sources (AVINT) or the nominal mortgage interest rate (MORINT).
Dependent
Variable In (MSQDW) ln (MSQDW) In (MSQDW) In (MSQDW)















































KEY: (t - statistics are between
a: significant at the 0.01 level
b: " 0.05
C: " 0.01 "































brackets, below the coeffic-






is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that many households trade
away extra space.
The insignificant coefficient of HHS is puzzling. One would think
that household size would influence the size of dwellings. We did not
expect the effect to be very large because we assumed that there are
economies of scale in the use of dwellings. But it may also be that
for most households their preferences are such that they do not expand
their dewellings when family size increases.
If we want to check the hypothesis that ln(PUBRAT) and ln(HHS)
do not belong in Equation (2) and that the demand for dwelling space
is solely a function of ln(GDPHH), ln(COSTMSQ), ln(COLD) and ln(DEBRAT)
we have to test the hypothesis that these two variables are jointly
insignificant. The results of the test are shown on the second row
of Table 6.5. Since this test statistic is smaller than the critical
value of the X2 statistic at the 0.95 level of confidence we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient b5 and b6 of the
variables ln(PUBRAT) and ln(HHS) are equal to zero.
We re-estimate Equation (2) without those two variables and the
results are shown in column 4 of Table 6.3. Since we have used the
logarithmic form the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.
The coefficients of ln(GDPHH) and ln(COSTMSQ) indicate an income
elasticity of 0.3 and a price elasticity of -0.4. This result agrees
with Mayo's conclusion in his survey of the recent literature on
housing demand in the United States. He concludes that on average the
demand for housing is both income and price inelastic (Mayo, 1979, p.
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12, 14). Our results for both income and price elasticities of demand
are comparable to and near the bottom of the range of those reported
in Mayo's survey (ibidem, p. 4-6).
The coefficient of ln(COLD) is small and seems to confirm our hunch
that the reduction in the demand for space induced by higher recurrent
expenses in cold climates is only partly offset by the increased demand
for space that would derive from spending more time indoors to escape
an inclement climate.
The coefficient of ln(DEBRAT) is rather small at 0.18. Since the
availability of formal housing finance affects the cost of housing to
families, the low elasticity of DEBRAT is consistent with the fairly
low income and price elasticity we have estimated. (4) The effect of
DEBRAT should not be underplayed however. The variation of DEBRAT in
our sample is large, the maximum observation being 600 percent of the
minimum observation. Our elasticity estimate indicates that if DEBRAT
can be increased that much, then housing investment will rise by
approximately 100 percent, clearly not a negligible change. Though
that much variation in DEBRAT is evidently possible across countries,
for one country to increase the debt to value ratio to this extent
may demand major efforts and considerable time.
3. Supply Price
We now turn to the estimation of the supply side of the model
the results of which are presented in Table 6.4. In column one we have
estimated the supply side of the model as specified in Equation (3).
Neither the coefficients of ln(PUBRAT) or ln(CONRAT) appear to be
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Table: 6.4 Regression Results: The cost of dwelling construction per
meter squared (COSTMSQ) as a function of gross domestic product per
household (GDPHH), a measure of cold (COLD), the ratio between public
housing production and the increase in the stock (PUBRAT), and the
ratio of all construction and the gross domestic product at (CONRAT).
KEY: (t - statistics are between brackets, below the coefficients)
a:- significant at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test.
b: " 0.05 " 
"I
c: 0.01 " two-tailed "
d: 0.05 " "t















No. of Observations 19 19
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significant. For the coefficient of ln(CONRAT) this means that, as
measured by the available data we can find no evidence that a long run
bottleneck influences the cost of housing space. However, this hypo-
thesis should be tested further with a more refined specification and
with both more refined and more reliable data.
The effect on average quality and thus on average costs of the
level of public housing production which we had tentatively suggested
is not confirmed by the insignificant coefficient of ln(PUBRAT).
Before we can re-estimate Equation (3) without in(PUBRAT) and
ln(CONRAT) we must test the joint hypothesis that those two variables
are jointly insignificant. The result of the tests are shown on the
third row of Table 6.5. Since the test statistic is less than the
critical value of the X2 statistic at the 0.95 level of confidence, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients c4 and c5 of
ln(PUBRAT) and ln(CONRAT) are equal to zero. Our re-estimate is found
in the second column of Table 6.4 The coefficient of COLD is very
close to being significant at the 0.95 level of confidence and is
positive and small as expected. Still we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that the coefficient of COLD is zero. This indication of
either a very small effect or no effect at all of COLD on COSTMSQ
cannot easily be explained. COLD was included to capture both the
effects of the difficulty of building in cold weather and the increased
quality cold climates require. While one can imagine that construc.-
tion techniques have fully adapted to the rigorous climate conditions
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Table: 6.5 Results of tests of restrictions on the coefficients.
Value of Critical Value
Restrictions Test Statistic of X2
a4 = a5 = a6 = 0 0.99 7.81
b5 = b6 = 0 0.55 5.99
c4 = c5 = 0 1.50 5.99
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it is hard to believe that there is no increase in the quality of the
the dwelling, especially in the shell, required by cold climates.
However we have not controlled for costs of materials and the cost of
these may be related to climate, particularly since they are often non-
traded goods. In cold climates wood is almost always plentiful and
cheap and will thus bring down construction costs.
The income elasticity of construction costs per meter squared
was supposed to capture both the effects of increase of construction
labor costs and the increase in dwelling quality across incomes. The
0.7 coefficient of ln(GDPHH) seems to indicate that construction costs
do increase with income in the long run. There is however no evidence
that construction costs outrun incomes, a complaint one often hears and
reads (see Chapter I).
D. Summary
The results on the supply equation must be considered quite ten-
tative. The general insignificance of the variables indicates that
either the equation is misspecified or the data are simply too in-
accurate to really capture the desired effects. On the demand side
we have been able to get more convincing results. We have elminated
all but demographic effects on the demand for units. The coefficients
on demographic variables are significant and the estimates are of the
correct magnitude. The demand for space was found, as was expected,
to be sensitive to a number of variables. Price and income have
the expected effects, but the coefficients are quite low in absolute
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value. Climate was found to have a small but negative effect on space
demanded. Mortgage finance availability does have a positive effect
on demand, while public housing production was shown to have no effect
on the average dwelling size.
Now that we have estimated all the coefficients of the model we
can calculate the total development elasticity of the use of dwelling
space. This figure will give us an estimate of how the average quality
of housing consumed will evolve if there is no policy intervention at
all. Previous studies have not been able to answer this question for
two reasons. First, previous cross country regressions were not
specified to answer this particular question. The dependent variable
in these regressions was total housing investment, so the coefficient
of income in these equations reflects the effects of income on the
quality of housing, the quantity of housing and the variation of the
price of housing across countries. (5) Our specification disentangles
these variables and what influences them so that the effect of income
on the quality (6) of housing can be evaluated. Because our specifi-
cation is so different, our results are not directly comparable with
the results of Strassman, Eckaus, and Burns and Grebler that were
discussed in Chapter II. The specification of demand equations in
cross sectional studies for the United States is closer to ours, but
they do not close the system with a supply side. Since those studies
do not estimate the effect of income on the supply price of housing, it
is not possible to calculate what we call the development elasticity
of housing.
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Our specification takes into account the effects of income on the
demand side and the effects of income on the supply price of housing as
well. It is only by estimating the magnitudes of these two effects
that one can obtain an overall development elasticity of housing
quality. We calculate the total development elasticity as follows:
3MSQDW _ 3MSQDW + 3MSQDW 3COSTMSQ
'DGDPHH ~ 3GDPHH 3COSTMSQ 3GDPHH
= 0.35 + (-0.44 x 0.60)
0.09
The development elasticity of approximately 0.1 indicates that the
use of housing space increases very slowly as income increases. A
tenfold increase of income will only double the dwelling space used per
household. Note that this low development elasticity is consistent
with more casual observations that housing quality grows slowly with
income growth. Apparently, most of the increases in household income
and ability to pay are offset by rises in prices (Rodwin, 1961, p. 2).
However, this casual observation that income gains are wiped out by cost
increases is often coupled with an argument that the housing market
functions imperfectly. We argued earlier that prices could rise with
income and wipe out income gains even if markets function properly,
and our results support this. We specified the supply side to allow
for a long run bottleneck, yet we found no evidence for one. Since we
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could not test for all possible types of imperfections, our results
should not be considered definitive. Nonetheless we find that even
in the absence of the type of imperfections hypothesized, the total
development elasticity of housing quality is low.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VI
(1) In the text we will test the model using ln(DEBRAT) in Appendix
D we discuss the results obtained when alternative variables are used.
(2) In Appendix D we have re-estimated Equation (2) with ln(MDEBRAT)
instead of ln(DEBRAT) in a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation.
The coefficients similar to the ones obtained in the OLS estimation
with ln(MDEBRAT) and are similar to the OLS estimation of Equation (2)
when ln(DEBRAT) is used. This confirms that DEBRAT is a valid proxy
for MDEBRAT.
(3) This version of the equation was also estimated OLS because the
endogeneity test indicated no endogeneity bias. For details, see
Appendix D.
(4) The elasticity using MDEBRAT instead of DEBRAT are almost identi-
cal (see Appendix D).
(5) This can be seen by noting that total investment expenditure is
equal to:
STOK * MSQDW. * COSTMSQ.
Other cross country regressions used this entire term (divided by GDP)
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as the dependent variable whereas we estimated equations for these
terms separately.
(6) Quality is measured here by the average housing space.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we set out to explore the determinants of housing
investment. But the motivation of the study was the policy issue of
how governments can intervene to alleviate the serious housing problem
facing many countries. Looking into the housing problem, one realizes
that among the observers who concur that a problem does exist there is
considerable disagreement as to the exact nature of the housing situa-
tion and the reason for dissatisfaction with it. Government officials
are concerned that there is an insufficient number of units to meet the
needs of the population. Others argue that while nearly everyone is
able to find a home, large numbers of households must be satisfied with
dwellings of unacceptably low quality. Neither the administrative nor
the ethnographic view states explicitly why they consider the conditions
over which they argue constitute a problem.
While designing our empirical work so that policies to remedy
different types of housing problems could be evaluated, we also tried
to find out which of the views of the situation is more accurate. For
this purpose, we assembled two independent data sources, official
housing production statistics and census data. After weighing the
merits and demerits of the two, we concluded that census data was the
more accurate source. Examining that data, we concluded that there is
little evidence that the aggregate shortages that government publica-
tions are wont to declare actually exist: the number of dwellings
matches the number of households quite closely. Casual observation
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also provides much evidence to support this conclusion.
Besides ascertaining which view of the housing situation was the
correct one, we pursued the issue further to uncover the reason for
the misconception of the situation. We considered it worthwhile to
examine the origins of the shortage view of the housing situation,
because this view is so widespread among policymakers and even among
scholars. We attributed inaccurate perception of the problem by the
government to reliance on house production statistics that are biased.
Because they require that housing meet unrealistic standards to be
counted, these statistics cannot take into account low quality housing
production. To some observers, widespread low quality in housing may
be the very crux of the problem, yet official statistics neglect to
look at it or count it.
Besides generating biased statistics, unrealistic housing standards
and the values that underlie them, favor the formulation of policy that
may be both unworkable and ineffective. More specifically, one can
calculate the amount of resources necessary to satisfy needs for new
housing at an acceptable level of quality. We did so and found that
they are out of line with what could be mobilized within a reasonable
time frame, let alone what is immediately available. But because some-
how these standards are considered of value in and of themselves, no
matter how unrealistic, when policy is retailored from the desirable to
the achievable, only the size of programs and not the substance is
changed. This results in what we call "a lot for a few" policies. We
then suggested that it is quite likely that these policies will be
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less effective than would be expected because while momentarily alter-
ing the housing outcome, they do not affect the mechanism generating
future outcomes, and this mechanism might well counteract the policy.
In our econometric work, we wanted to examine whether public
housing policies, and some other policies such as subsidies or pro-
vision of mortgage finance have or would have an effect on housing
investment. We divided housing investment into two components: the
number of units and the meters squared per unit. The divergence of
views as to the nature of the housing problem,one emphasizing the
quantity of units and the other their quality, indicates that any ex-
planation of housing investment useful for policy formulation must
treat quantity and quality separately. Of course, the average surface
area of new dwellings is only a very crude measure of quality, and
further research should be devoted to studying the variation of other
quality attributes. The reason we did not treat quality in more de-
tail was the lack of data comparable across countries. The efforts
the United Nations has made to standardize the measurement of dwelling
space have borne fruit, now a similar effort should be made for other
quality dimensions.
Regarding the demand for new units, we found that this was de-
termined uniquely by demographic variables. Also, on the supply side
there was no effect of the quantity of units on price. Given the
values of the point estimates of the parameters (elasticity with re-
spect to new household formation close to one) we conclude that there
is no shortfall in the additions to the housing stock, just as there
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was no shortage in the existing housing stock. Thus all the evidence
we have uncovered in this thesis indicates that perceiving the housing
situation as characterized primarily by an aggregate defecit of dwell-
ing units is incorrect. If there is a problem, it lies in the low
quality of the housing that must suffice for so large a portion of the
population.
We have a number of results that indicate how policy can affect
quality, as reflected in space. Income and price were both significant
in the determination of demand for space. However the elasticities of
demand with respect to these variables were both less than one. This
suggests that making housing cheaper would have a positive effect on
the quality of housing consumed, but such policies are not likely to
be able to change price enough to drastically alter the quality of
houses people will choose to buy. The low income elasticity of demand
and low total development elasticity indicates that as a country be-
comes richer the quality of housing will improve, but this process is
likely to unroll quite slowly.
Public housing construction is not significant in either the
determination of the size of new dwellings or in the number of new
units. This finding is evidence that misconceptions as to the nature
of the housing situation do matter. Construction of proper housing
should be an effective remedy if there is a shortfall in private pro-
duction. But suppose people can find themselves a home, so that all
demands are satisfied at going prices, and in equilibrium almost all
families have dwellings. Yet many families simply cannot afford a
- 154 -
decent home. If this is the case the problem cannot be remedied by
producing more good houses. Giving a family a home worth more than
they can afford does not change the fact that at the prices reigning
in the market, such a home is more than they would buy themselves
and they may trade it in the housing market for other consumption. Our
results suggest that families may respond in just this fashion when
they receive public housing.
Mortgage finance appears to have a positive but small effect on
the demand for space in new housing. Our guess is that the effects of
easier housing finance might be much greater if finance were made
available to the lower income classes. As it is now, finance policies
are often implemented in a "template" spirit, this means they are only
available for construction satisfying fairly rigorous standards which
only the relatively well off can meet. Again it is clear that over-
emphasis on meeting high standards may be encouraging policy that does
not attack the most pressing problem, the low quality of housing that
the poor can afford. Financing standard housing may marginally in-
crease the number of standard dwellings but if one wants to help those
living in the worst conditions, financing even substandard housing for
the poorest families could significantly improve their living condi-
tions.
In our study of the supply of new housing we found no evidence for
a long run bottleneck. Thus it appears that the mechanism by which
short run bottlenecks are eliminated is effective, though this
conclusion is quite tentative. The data for the supply side estima-
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tion were admittedly crude and further work in this area should be
undertaken. Detailed case studies for a few countries might shed more
light on this question. In any case, though our work suggests that
long run bottlenecks are insignificant, this does not imply that the
same is true for short run bottlenecks or that policy action against
short run bottlenecks is not warranted.
Our supply analysis, for lack of data, neglected the price of
land in determining housing investment. Again until internationally
comparable data on the price of residential land is available, this
factor can only be examined in the context of case studies. But some
attention to this would be worthwhile because land prices are potential-
ly quite important and could cause bottlenecks in the long run.
In evaluating all the results one must be mindful of an important
simplification made throughout. We studied the determination of an
average measure of quantity and quality and did not look at the distri-
bution that generated these averages. There are two main weaknesses
in this approach. First, a number of distributions of different size
new homes give the same figure for the average surface per home that
we used, yet the desirability of these alternative configurations
may differ considerably. Second, averages ignore the spatial distribu-
tion of housing and of demographic variables. We could not verify if
regional housing investment was responding properly to migration and
differential rates of population growth. Some detailed surveys might
indicate whether neglect of these regional factors would change our
results significantly.
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The overall thrust of our work is that housing investment, par-
ticularly in terms of units produced, but also to some extent in terms
of the quality of these units, is quite insensitive to most policy
instruments. Effecting sizable changes in aggregate housing investment
may be impossible because one simply cannot change the policy instru-
ments to the extent required. Without policy intervention, income
growth may only bring improvements very slowly. This insensitivity of
housing demand to a number of policy variables is not so surprising
when one considers the primary of housing among a family's needs. For
such an important expenditure item, marginal changes in the constraints
are unlikely to alter household decisions drastically. This very essen-
tiality of housing is quite consistent with the finding that the housing
problem is not too few dwellings but too many low quality dwellings.
People find the means to acquire something as crucial as shelter. But
the constraints of the market and of income distribution may make the
solution they find unsatisfactory in many ways. An implication of all
this for policy is that perhaps the focus should be turned away from ag-
gregate variables such as units produced or even size. Policy might be
more effectively directed to facilitating the acquisition of just those
quality features that individual households find most difficult to pro-
vide for themselves, such as utilities, roads, and waste disposal. The
demand for them might be considerably more sensitive to policy interven-
tion than the demand for housing space.
To conclude, if the goal of policy is to create more equality in
housing conditions, then the standard policies may not help. Ine-
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quality of housing is the product of inequality in the distribution
of income and wealth. The rookeries of Victorian London did not dis-
appear because of the efforts of the five percent philanthropists nor
because of the incessant slum clearance drives. The housing conditi-
tions of the poor only improved after the Dock strikes of 1889, when
labor started to organize. It is only around 1914, when the War effort
geared the economy to full employment, that the rokeries vanished and
the work houses emptied. Housing conditions, like nutrition, health,
and education conditions can only be made more equal when household







appendix, we will first discuss the general rules we used
the data. Then we will give a variable by variable de-
the data sources.
A. General Rules Applied for the Assembly of Data
1. The data were assembled by using first the data available in
the latest edition of any source.
2. When necessary, we referred to earlier editions of the source.
In all cases, we used the most recent of these earlier editions
in which the necessary data appeared.
3. Data from more recent sources often differ from those of
earlier sources, because mistakes have been corrected or be-
cause definitional changes have been made. When there was an
overlap of at least one year between sources the whole series
was smoothed by adjusting the data from the earlier sources




A measure of cold
SOURCES OF DATA: for all countries except Belgium.
Ruffner and Bain. The Weather Almanac 1977, for
Belgium, Conway.The Weather Handbook, 1963. We used an
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average of extreme cold temperatures (ET) for the main
cities of each country. Because we had to take the
logarithm of COLD we had to avoid negative numbers. We
raised the "zero" level to 64 (because 64*F, for
Panama, was the highest minimum) and then changed all
signs from negative to positive. COLD = (ET-64). As a
result of this transformation the larger the number the
colder the climate.
COSTMSQ: Construction cost per meter squared
SOURCES OF DATA: We used the same U.N. sources and the
same procedure as for MSQDW except that to calculate
costs we divided a 6-year average of the total value of
residential construction by a 6-year average of total
meter squared produced.
However for a few countries the U.N. data had to
be completed from other sources:
BELGIUM: The price per housing unit found in Royaume
de Belgique, Institut National de Statistique,
Statistiques de la Construction et du Logement,
various years, was divided by the MSQDW.
BRAZIL: The time series of construction cost was
constructed from the construction cost in 1970 found
in Giberga, M.R., Housing and Urban Development in
Latin America: Comparative Construction Costs in
Latin American Countries, 1973, and a construction
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cost index found in World Bank, Latin American and
the Caribbean Regional Office, Brazil: Human Re-
sources Special Report, 1979.
CHILE: Data from U.N. sources were completed from:
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, Study of International Housing,
June 28, 1978 and from Giberga 1973, op. cit.
FRANCE: The data from U.N. sources were completed
with data from: Ministere de l'Equipment et de
l'amenagement du territorie, Direction du Batiment
et des Travaux Publics et de la Conjoncture, Bureau
des Enquetes sur le Marche du Batiment. Enquete sur
la commercialization des logements neufs, 1977.
NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN and UNITED KINGDOM: Data for 1960
were obtained from United Nations, Secretariat of
the Economic Commission for Europe. Housing Costs
in European Countries, 1963.
DEB: The value of the outstanding housing mortgage debt
(issued throught the financial sector).
SOURCES OF DATA: All data were collected from country
sources. (The level of mortgage outstanding was mea-
sured at the time of the last census year used to cal-
culate STOK.)
AUSTRALIA: From Reserve Bank of Australia: Statisti-
tical Bulletin: Financial Flow Accounts Supplement,
- 161 -
various years and from a personal communication
from Mr. Shane T. O'Donohue, Finance Section, Re-
search Department of the Reserve Bank of Australia.
BELGIUM: From Krediet Bank, Bulletin Hebdomadaire,
1975, and from a personal communication from Mr.
W. Janssens, Afdelingsdirecteur, Kredietbank, N.V.
Brussels.
BRAZIL: From Fundacao Getulio Vargas Conjunctura
Economica, 1979.(These data were comparable to more
disaggregate data found in Banco Central do Brazil.
Boletin do Banco Central do Brasil, various years.
CANADA: From Central Mortgage and Housing Corpora-
tion, Canadian Housing Statistics, 1978.
CHILE: From Banco Central de Chile. Boletin Mensual.
various years.
COLOMBIA: From Banco de la Republica. Revista del
Banco de la Republica, various years.
COSTA RICA: From Banco Central de Costa Rica.
Boletin Estadistico, various years.
DENMARK: From Danmarks Nationalbank. Reports and
Accounts for the year 1976 and previous years.
EGYPT: From the Joint Housing Team for Finance.
Housing Finance in Egypt, 1977 (those data were
comparable to the data available in: International
Monetary Fund, Arab Republic of Egypt: Recent
- 162 -
Economic Developments, 1977.)
FINLAND: No data available.
FRANCE: From Institut de la Statistique et des etudes
economiques. Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1978.
GERMANY (W): From Deutsche Bundesbank.Monthly Report,
various years.
GREECE: From Hellenic Republic.Monthly Statistical
Bulletin, various years.
JAPAN: From Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics
Monthly, various years, and Bank of Japan, Economic
Statistics Annual, various years. In Japan em-
ployers provide a large portion of housing finance.
According to our definition such financing would be
classified as non formal. Data are only available
for a few firms (Goldberg, 1971).
NETHERLANDS: From a personal communication from Mr.
H.H. van Wijk, Chief Domestic Research Department,
De Nederlands Bank, Amsterdam.
NEW ZEALAND: From Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
Bulletin, various years.
NORWAY: From Norges Bank, Economic Bulletin, various
years.
PANAMA: From United States, Agency for International
Development, Panama Shelter Sector Assessment, 1977.
PHILIPPINES: No data.
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SWEDEN: From Sveriges Riksbank. Statistical Appendix
to the Annual Report, various years.
SYRIA: No data.
UNITED KINGDOM: From United Kingdom, Annual Abstract
of Statistics, various years.
UNITED STATES: From U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. Housing and Urban Development
Trends, 1977.
VENEZUELA: From Banco Central de Venzuela. Revista
del Banco Central de Venezuela, various years.
YUGOSLAVIA: National Bank of Yugoslavia. Quarterly
Bulletin, various years (includes small amounts for
"communal development").
ADEB: The change in the value of the outstanding housing
mortgages.
SOURCES OF DATA: Same sources as DEB. ADEB is used to
calculate the marginal debt to value ratio (MDEBRAT).
Because the divisor is the value of the change in the
housing stock between censuses, ADEB is calculated by
substracting the level of outstanding mortgages at the
time of the earlier census from the level at the time
of the later census. Because ADEB requires more data
than DEB the following countries are excluded: in
addition to those excluded for DEB: Chile, Panama,
Sweden, Yugoslavia.
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APUB: Production of public housing between census years. (We
have included all public dwellings, for rent or sale,
regardless of the income class they were built for.)
SOURCES OF DATA: For most countries: United Nations.
Yearbook of Construction Statistics, various years, and
for European countries United Nations, Economic Commis-
sion for Europe. Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building
Statistics for Europe, various years.
For a few countries it was necessary to complete
the data from additional sources.
BELGIUM: From Royaume de Belgique, Ministere des
Travaux Publics. La politique du Logment en Belgique,
1976.
CANADA: From Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation,
Canadian Housing Statistics, various years.
GREECE: Papaioanno., E. Katoikia Sten Hellada, 1975.
PANAMA: From a personal communication from Mr. Earl
Kessler of the U.S. AID mission to Panama.
UNITED STATES: From U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. Statistical Yearbook, various
years.
ASTOK: The change in the number of units in the housing stock
between census years.
SOURCES OF DATA: Please see STOK.
GDPCAP: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.
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SOURCES OF DATA: Calculated from GDP at current market
prices and population figures found in: International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Tables,
1976. For each country the GDPCAP was calculated for
the last year of the census interval used for ASTOK
data.
HHS: Household size.
SOURCES OF DATA: Calculated from the total number of
population and the total number of households.
The population figures were obtained from: In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
World Bank Tables,1976 and 1978 and household data from
the United Nations Compendium of Housing Statistics,
various years. For a few countries it was necessary
to glean household and population data from country
sources.
COLOMBIA: Household and population figures for 1973
were obtained from Republica de Colombia.XIV Censo
Nacional de Poblacion y III de Vivienda 1973:
Muestra de Avance Resumen de los Departamentos,
1977.
VENEZUELA: The number of households in 1971 was ob-
tained from Republica de Venezuela.Annuaro Estadis-
tico, 1973.
In addition, because of missing data we had to make the
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following assumptions:
EGYPT: Since the household data were not available
for 1964 we assumed HHS was the same as 1960.
UNITED KINGDOM: Number of households in Northern
Ireland for 1961 are missing. We calculated that
number of assuming that the average growth rate of
the number of households in Northern Ireland be-
tween 1961 and 1966 was the same as the average
rate for England, Wales and Scotland over the same
period.
MORINT: The interest rate on Mortgaged housing loans.
SOURCES OF DATA: All data were collected from country
sources. (The interest rates are six year averages
with last year coinciding with the year of the last
census used in the calculation of STOK.)
AUSTRALIA: From Reserve Bank of Australia.Statistical
Bulletin; Financial Flow Accounts Supplement,
various years.
BELGIUM: From Association Belge des Entreprises
Hypothequaires.Rapport du Comit'e Central a l'Assem-
blee Generale du 21 juin 1977, Brussels, Belgium.
BRAZIL: For Brazil we have added the yearly monetary
correction which is applied to the principal to
the nominal interest rate on loans. The monetary
correction was obtained from Fundacao Getulio
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Vargas. Conjunctura Economica, 1979, and the
nominal interest rate from World Bank.Brazil: Human
Resources Special Report, 1975.
CANADA: From Bank of Canada. Bank of Canada Review,
1976 and 1978.
CHILE: No data available.
COLOMBIA: From a personal communication by Professor
Fernando Jimenes, Universitad de Los Andes, Bogata,
Colombia.
COSTA RICA: From Banco Central de Costa Rica Boletin
Estadistico, various years.
DENMARK: From Danmarks Nationalbank.Reports and Ac-
counts for the year 1976 and previous years.
EGYPT: From the Joint Housing Team for Finance.
Housing Finance in Egypt, 1977.
FINLAND: No data available.
FRANCE: From Institut de la Statistique et des etudes
'economiques, Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1978.
GERMANY (W): From Deutsche Bundesbank.Monthly Report,
various years.
GREECE: Bank of Greece. Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
various years.
JAPAN: From Bank of Japan. Economic Statistics Annual,
1975, various years.
NETHERLANDS: Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek.
- 168 -
Maandstatistiek Financiewezen, 1978.
NEW ZEALAND: From Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Bulletin, various years.
NORWAY: Only one year (1969) was available from
Norges Bank. Economic Bulletin, 1969.
PANAMA: Personal communication from Mr. Earl Kessler
of the U.S. AID mission to Panama.
PHILIPPINES: No data.
SWEDEN: From Sveriges Riksbank. Statistical Appendix
to the Annual Report, various years.
SYRIA: For only one year (1970) from U.S. Congress,
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs. Study of International Housing, June 28,
1971.
UNITED KINGDOM: From United Kingdom. Annual Abstract
of Statistics, various years. Interest rates refer
to building societies only.
UNITED STATES: From U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. Housing and Urban Developmcnt
Trends, various years.
VENEZUELA: From a personal communication from
Professor Hugo Manzanilla, Universidad Central de
Venezuela, Caracas.
YUGOSLAVIA: From a personal communication by Boris
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Pleskovic, Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
M.I.T.
MSQDW: Meter squared per dwelling
SOURCES OF DATA: For European countries: United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe. Statistical Survey,
various years; for other countries except Canada:
United Nations. Compendium of Housing Statistics, various
years; and for Canada, Central Mortgage and Housing
Corporation. Canadian Housing Statistics, 1979. The
figures for Canada referred only to dwellings financed
under the National Housing Act.
Our intent was to use only data for "dwelling
completed," when those were not available we used data
from "starts" statistics and when those were not avail-
able either, we used data on "authorised dwellings".
We obtained MSQDW by dividing 6-year averages of
total meter squared of completed dwellings by 6-year
averages of total units produced (less than years were used
in cases of missing observations). The six years were
chosen to coincide with the last six years of the census
interval we used to calculate ASTOK.
When housing production was expressed in cubic
meter rather than square meter we divided the cubic
meter figure first by 4. This figure is an average
cubic meter per square meter calculated from data of
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countries which reported production both in cubic
meters and square meters.
For France the data available from United Nations
sources were completed from: Ministare de l'environ-
ment et du cadre de vie, Direction des Affaires Econom-
iques et Internationales. Statistiques de permis de con-
struire en 1975 and 1976 date reele, and from: Ministere
de la Construction, Bulletin Statistique, various years.
NOMGRO: The nominal growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product.
SOURCES OF DATA: Calculated from GDP at current market
prices found in International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, World Tables, 1976. NOMGRO is a 6-
year average with the last year taken to coincide with
the year of the last census used to calculate ASTOK.
NONRESCON: The value of nonresidential construction.
SOURCES OF DATA: From United Nations, Yearbook of
Construction Statistics, various years.
OFF: Official figures on the number of dwellings produced
between census years.
SOURCES OF DATA: United Nations. Compendium of Housing
Statistics, and the U.N., Yearbook of Construction
Statistics, various years.
To obtain the total dwelling production between
census year we omitted the production during the first
year of the interval and instead included production
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during the last year. Because of official production
figures increase over time this caused a slight over-
estimate of R (the ratio of official units produced to
the change in the housing stock).
For some countries it was necessary to complete the
U.N. data from national sources.
COSTA RICA: For 1963-1967: Republica de Costa Rica.
Annuario Estadistico de Costa Rica, various years.
JAPAN: For 1970, Empire of Japan. Japan Statistical
Yearbook, 1978.
VENEZUELA: For 1961-1964, the data came from a per-
sonal communication from Professor Hugo Manzanilla
at the Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas
and for 1965 from Republic de Venezuela. Boletin
Mensual de Estadistica, 1965.
YUGOSLAVIA: For 1965-1971, Socijalistika Federativna
Republika Yugoslavia, Statisticki Godisnjak
Yugoslaviji, 1975.
POPGRO-20: The rate of population growth twenty years before the
base year.
SOURCES OF DATA: All data were collected from the
United Nations.Demographic Yearbook, various years.
We calculated a 5-year average population growth
rate and chose the last year to be twenty years before
the year of the last census used to calculate ASTOK
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(usually 1970).
STOK: The number of units in the housing stock.
SOURCES OF DATA: The United Nations. Compendium of
Housing Statistics, various years, except for Colombia.
the 1973 figure which came from Republica de Colombia.
XIV Censo Nacional de Poblacion, 1977.
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APPENDIX B
CALCULATION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP) FIGURES FOR
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, AND POLAND
Because GNP figures are not directly available from the United
Nations, other data sources were used to calculate them separately.
The procedure used, which is the same for the three countries, was
suggested by Dr. Thad Alton of the Research Project on National Income
of East European Countries in New York. A GNP series was constructed
from a GNP index (found in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
1970, p. 230), and an estimate of GNP in current U.S. dollars for 1965
provided by Dr. Thad Alton. We assumed that our GNP estimates were riot
significantly different from the true GDP and used the former to cal-
culate Cross Domestic Product per Household (GDPHH) and Gross Domestic
Product per Capita (GDPCAP).
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APPENDIX C
A REVIEW OF THE STATISTICAL RESULTS OBTAINED BY BURNS AND GREBLER
IN THEIR WORK ON THE DETERMINANTS OF HOUSING INVESTMENT
In this appendix, we will discuss in some detail, the empirical re-
sults of Burns and Grebler (1977). We have chosen to examine their
work in more detail than other work cited in Chapter11because it is the
most recent empirical work in the area of cross country analysis of
housing investment, and it has received a great deal of attention. We
wanted to try to duplicate their results using our two sets of data,
official housing production figures and census measures of the change
in the housing stock. We also analyzed their results for robustness
to certain details of the specification.
First, we will attempt to duplicate their results. The data was
taken from the same sources as those used by Burns and Grebler (for
details, please see Note 1 in this appendix). The sample was also the
same except for the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. It was impossible to in-
clude this observation because there was a discontinuity between 1967
and 1968 in the residential construction data. In general, for the
earlier period out t-statistics and R2 are lower than in Grebler and
Burns' results while for the later period ours are higher (see Table
Cl). The time-series cross section estimation yielded results compara-
ble to Grebler and Burns as well. (Please see Table C2.)
Because there is no prior knowledge of the signs of the dependent
variable in the regression proposed by Burns and Grebler a two-tailed
Table: C-1 Comparison of estimatedparameters, regressions of the share of housing investment in
GDP(H ) on the GDP per capita (Y ), growth rate of population (gt-n), and the ratio of the urban popu-
latioh growth rate to the nation Tnpopulation growth rate (u )
Earlier Period (5) ,La Period Short Lag (7)Earlie  5_a~.~r (6) ___
Our
Independent Burns and Estimates
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KEY: (t-statistics are between brackets, below the coefficients) (4)



























Table: C-2 Comparison of estimated parameters, regressions with
pooled cross-section time series sample of the share of housing in
GDP (H t) on the GDP per capita (Y ), growth rate of population
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(n.r.) = not reported
KEY: (t - statistics are between brackets, below the coefficients) (4)
a: significant at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test
b: " 0.05 " "1 "1
c: " 0.01 " two-tailed "








rather than a one-tailed test, some of t-statistics which were signifi-
cant in Burns and Grebler's one-tailed test are no longer significant.
Because Burns and Grebler did not justify the lags they used, seven
years for the earlier period and six for the later priod, we tested
whether their results were robust to a change in the lag. By combining
the data set for the earlier and later periods we shortened the lag to
two years (4). The results with this shorter lag gives coefficients of Y
and Y2 similar to those of the other regressions, but these are now
the only significant coefficients. The three other variables, g, g2
and n2 are not significant (see table Cl).
Burns and Grebler used official housing investment data. We have
attempted to replicate their results using two sets of data. The first
is the official number of dwellings produced times the officially
measured unit cost. (H = OFF * MSQDW * COSTMSQ). This is quite
similar to the national income accounts data used by Burns and Grebler.
The second is the annual average change in the housing stock times the
officially measured unit cost (NH = ASTOK * MSQDW * COSTMSQ). As we
have shown in Chapter 3, the official dwelling production figures are
less reliable than the stock increase figure calculated from census
results.
The results of the regression are shown in Table C3 (the source
of the data used for each variable is discussed in Appendix A ). The
results using the official production figures (H) are similar to
the results obtained by Burns and Grebler.
The Y (GDP per capita) and Y2 terms and the u2 (urban population
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Table: C-3
Regression Results: Ratio of housing investment (H and HN) on income
per capita (Y) population growth rate (g), ratio of urban population
growth rate and national population growth rate (u).
Dependent
Vaniable
H, Official number of HN, Change in stock time
units produced times official unit cost
Independen official unit cost divided by GDP per capita


























KEY: (t - statistics are between brackets, below the coefficients)
a: significant at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test




0.10 " one-tailed "









growth rate divided by national population rate) are significant but
the g (population growth) and g2 are not. When the net housing invest-
ment divided by GDP (NH) is used for the dependent variable only u2 is
significant.
The fact that Burns and Grebler's specification of the housing
equation is neither robust to the data source, particularly to what we
feel is a superior data source, nor to the lag structure, is an indica-
tion that their specification is simply not a suitable explanation of
the determinants of housing investment.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX C
(1) The data for the attempted replication of the results obtained by
Burns and Grebler in their work on the determinants of housing invest-
ment was assembled as follows. (The general rules mentioned in Appendix
A were taken into account.)
H, the share of the value of residential construction in gross
domestic product (GDP) was obtained by dividing the sum of residential
construction for each period by the sum of GDP for the same period.
The data for residential construction were obtained from the
United Nations. Yearbook of National Accounts, 1978.
However, some problems were encountered:
- For Costa Rica and Switzerland, the available data were for all
construction. We assumed that 30% of all construction is
residential construction.
- For Luxemburg, there is a discontinuity in the data between
1967 and 1968 without overlap. There is, thus, no way to
build a linked index to smooth the data series.
- For the Philippines the data for residential construction for
1963 and 1965 were missing. However, the data for all con-
struction were available. It was assumed that for those years
the percentage of residential construction in all construction
was the same as in previous years.
- The data for residential construction for Spain were missing
for the years 1966 and 1967. The series was completed by
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assuming a constant growth rate between 1965 and 1968.
- The data for residential construction for Venezuela were
missing for the years 1963, 1966 and 1967. The series was com-
pleted by assuming the same growth rate as between 1964 and
1965.
The data for GDP were obtained from the IBRD World Tables, 1976. g,
the population growth rate and the rate of population increase in cities
of 100,000 or more necessary to calculate u, the urbanization rate co-
efficient, were obtained from Kingsley Davis. World Urbanization, 1969.
(2) Burns and Grebler's sample included 39 countries: Australia,
Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, El
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany (West), Greece, Honduras, Iceland,
Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea (South),
Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Portugal,
Puerto Rico, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States (Burns and Grebler, 77, p. 91).
(3) Our sample comprises 38 countries: those used by Burns and
Grebler minus Luxemburg.
(4) Burns and Grebler stated that there is only one chance in ten that
the true difference is not zero if the t value is 1.309 or greater and
one chance in a hundred if that value is 2.446 or greater (ibidem, p.
33-36). However, because there is no a priori reason to be confident
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about the signs of the coefficient a two-tailed test is the appropriate
one here. Thus, for a 90% level of confidence that t should be greater
than 1.892 and for a one percent level the t should be greater than
2.733. Burns and Grebler had 33 degrees of freedom, but since we ex-
cluded Luxemburg we only have 32 degrees of freedom. Hence, the
critical value of the t-statistics at a 90% confidence level is 1.694
and at a 99% confidence level the critical value is 2.739.
(5) 1963-1966 for the dependent variable, 1955-1950 for the independent
variables.
(6) 1967-1970 for the dependent variable, 1960-1965 for the independent
variables.
(7) We combined the data for the dependent variable for the earlier
period with data for the independent variables for the late period.
We used data for H in 1963-1966 with data for y, g and u for 1960-1965.
(8) The pooled cross section time series sample is assembled by merg-
ing the data set for the earlier and later estimates (see Table Cl).
Because those two data set have different lags, 7 years for the earlier




HYPOTHESIS TESTING ON ALTERNATIVE DEMAND SPECIFICATIONS
In this appendix we will test the use of MDEBRAT, AVINT and MORINT
as substitutes for DEBRAT to measure the effect of formal housing
finance on the demand for dwelling space. The specification of the
demand equation using DEBRAT was tested in Chapter VI.
For each replacement of DEBRAT by an alternative variable we will
use the same procedure as used in that chapter. We will first test the
system of equations for endogeneity bias, if there is such a problem we
will re-estimate the equation which is biased with 2SLS (the test we use
is fully described in Hausman, 1978, p. 1251-1271). If no endogeneity
bias exists the OLS estimates are acceptable. When we replace
in (DEBRAT) with ln(MDEBRAT) in Equation 2 (see Chapter VI) the test
statistics for Equation 2 and 3 are larger than the critical value of
X2 statistic at the 0.95 level of confidence and we can thus reject the
null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity bias. The results of the
test are shown in Table Dl. We are then obliged to re-estimate
Equation 2 and 3 with 2SLS. The results are found in Table D2 and D3.
In both cases the coefficients and the t-statistics are robust to change
from OLS to 2SLS. The coefficient found in Table D2 and D3 are similar
to those found in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. This indicates that our results
are robust to the use of ln(DEBRAT) instead of ln(MDEBRAT).
Next we will replace ln(DEBRAT) in Equation 2 by ln(AVINT). The
results of the endogeneity bias are found in Table D4. Since the
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Regression Results- Meter squared per dwelling (MSQDW) as a function of
Gross Domestic Product per household (GDPHH), cost per meter squared
(COSTMSQ), cold (COLD), the ratio between the number of public units
produced and the growth in the stock (PUBRAT), the household size (HHS),
and the ratio of the increase of outstanding mortgages to the value of








ln (GDPHH) 0.3609 0.3580
(1.97) (1.95)
In (COSTMSQ) -0.5565 -0.6513
(-2.27) (-2.19)
in (COLD) -0.3178 -0.3275
(-1.62) (-1.65)
In (PUBRAT) -0.0412 -0.0453
(-0.80) (-0.86)
in (HHS) -0.0403 0.0875
(-0.05) (-0.11)




Number of 14 14
Observations
KEY: (t-statistics are between brackets, below the coeeficients)
a: significant at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test
b: " 0.05 ""
c: " 0.01 "f two-tailed
d: " 0.05 " "
Table: D-3
Regression Results: The cost of dwelling construction per meter
squared (COSTMSQ) as a function of Gross Domestic Product per house-
hold (GDPHH), a measure of cold (COLD), the ratio between the number of
public units produced and the growth in the stock (PUBRAT), and the











In (PUBRAT) 0.0287 0.0368
(0.40) (0.50)
In (CONRAT) -0.1592 -0.1392
(0.46) (-0.40)
R 2 0.72 -
F 5.84b
Number of 14 14
Observations
KEY: (t-statistics are between brackets, below the coefficients)
a: significant at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test








Results of tests of endogeneity (replacing In (DEBRAT)





















three test statistics are smaller than the critical value of the X2
statistic at the 0.95 level of confidence, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there is no endogeneity bias. Therefore there is no
need to re-estimate the system with 2SLS and the OLS estimation found in
the second column of Table 6.3 is thus valid.
We repeated the endogeneity test replacing ln(DEBRAT) this time
with ln(MORINT). The results of the test are found in Table D5. Again
there is no need to re-estimate the system with 2SLS and the OLS es-
timation found in the first column of Table 6.3 in thus valid.
- 189 -
Table: D-5 Results of tests of endogeneity (replacing ln (DEBRAT) in
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